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The aim of this thesis is to test the state friendly hypothesis by comparing and integrating 
three different approaches to the study of judicial behavior in a hierarchical regression 
analysis. Decisions of the Norwegian Supreme Court in civil cases tend to favor the state over 
private party litigants. Acting as a court of last resort, only cases where the decision will have 
an impact beyond the case in question are adjudicated by the Supreme Court. By definition 
the sources of law do not point to a single indisputable solution in these cases. The question is 
whether these sources of law can be shaped to conform to a justice’s desired outcome through 
preference initiated behavior. Based on the assumption that law is not the sole determinant of 
judicial decisions in the Supreme Court the following research question is established: What 
factors can explain the decisions of Supreme Court justices when the state is a party? 
Building on theoretical and analytical frameworks from the literature on judicial behavior an 
integrated hierarchical model based on legal factors, attitudinal factors and strategic factors is 
developed in the theory-section of the thesis. This is an innovation in the social-science study 
of judicial decisions on the Norwegian Supreme Court, which thus far has failed to account 
for the strategic aspects and legal aspects of judicial decision-making. Another development 
presented in the thesis is the introduction of multilevel analysis as an analytical tool for the 
study of judicial decisions. The analysis is based on a two-level hierarchical generalized linear 
model where judges are nested in panels. 2,217 justice-observations grouped in 445 panels are 
included in the analysis. Predictors are added both at level-one and level-two based on 
hypotheses established for each level in the hierarchical framework. 
The analysis identified seven significant predictors affecting the probability of voting for or 
against the state. Interestingly, the significant predictors included both individual-level 
explanatory factors and group-level explanatory factors. However, the expected relationship 
between a proxy for ideology and the justices’ votes was not evident. The evidence supports 
the application of an integrated hierarchical model of judicial behavior in the analysis of 
judicial decisions. In unanimous decisions there is variance explained by the grouping 
structure in the data, which it is not possible to model in single-level analyses. Thus a 
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A State Friendly Court: An Analysis of Norwegian Supreme Court Decisions 
“The political element must be acknowledged, it must be revered, and it must be delimited. 
This is part of my legal world view (Smith 1990, 426, author's translation).” 
Chapter 1 - Introduction 
An interesting attribute of the Norwegian Supreme Court is that it is ‘state friendly’ insofar as 
statistically, the state wins more cases than private party litigants in civil cases.
1
 This is one of 
four claims constituting the state friendly hypothesis. Predisposition to vote in favor of the 
state due to personal attributes and ideological preferences of the justices constitute the 
second claim. The third claim is concerned with the impact of the collegial nature of the 
Court. A fourth claim relates to the importance of a case. In salient cases attitudes are 
expected to operate particularly strongly. Acting as a court of last resort, the Supreme Court 
only adjudicates cases where the decisions will have an impact beyond the case in question 
(Schei 2010, 13; 2011, 7). Only the hardest cases “where the different sources of law do not 
point to one single and/or indisputable solution”, are dealt with by the Court (Sunde 2011a, 
11). When the authoritative legal sources do not provide a clear-cut answer to a dispute more 
than one solution can be legally justifiable (Skoghøy 2011a, 713). The question is whether 
this can lead to legal sources being shaped to conform to a justice’ desired outcome – either 
consciously or sub-consciously, placing public interests before private interests.  
1.1 Research question 
The aim of the thesis is to test the state friendly hypothesis by comparing and integrating three 
different approaches to the study of judicial behavior based on the following research 
question: 
What factors can explain the decisions of Supreme Court justices when the state is a party? 
                                                          
1
 ‘State friendly’ is the literal translation of the Norwegian term ‘statsvennlig’. In previous research on judicial 
behavior on the Norwegian Supreme Court the term ‘government friendly’ has been used as a translation of the 
Norwegian term (e.g., Grendstad, Shaffer, and Waltenburg 2011b). However, differentiating between the terms 
‘government friendly’ and ‘state friendly’ is pertinent when the analysis’ focus is not so much on the effect of 
appointing government on the justices votes, but rather the effect of a variety of legal, attitudinal and institutional 
factors. In the hierarchical modeling approach used in this thesis the term ‘state friendly’ is employed to indicate 
a favorable position relative to the system.  The idea is similar to that of Skåre (1999, 67) who employs the term 
‘system friendly’ rather than ‘state friendly’. In the thesis the term ‘state friendly’ is applied, but the reasoning is 
similar to that of Skåre. If a judge is labeled ‘state friendly’ that may indicate that he or she favors the state 




The analysis will include all civil cases decided in five-justice panels from 1990 to 2010 
where the state was a party to the proceedings.
2
 By including unanimous decisions as well as 
non-unanimous decisions one can examine attributes causing disagreement as well as factors 
leading to agreement. The inclusion of all civil cases in the analysis separates the thesis from 
the majority of judicial research on the Norwegian Supreme Court thus far, which has been 
preoccupied with non-unanimous cases. 
1.2 Analysis of judicial decisions 
Although it is potentially difficult to divulge the effect of individual legal sources in 
determining a judge’s decision in unanimous cases, they do account for almost 80 percent of 
the cases decided by the Norwegian Supreme Court (Schei 2011, 8).
3
 Grendstad et al. (2011b, 
20) suggest that non-unanimous cases are specifically interesting because by themselves the 
legal sources fail to account for disagreement among the judges in these cases. Hence, it is 
reasonable to presume that non-unanimous cases can divulge a justice' preference for either 
the public or private interests (Skoghøy 2011a, 720). However, rather than indicating diverse 
views some legal factors may indicate coherent views (Jacobsen 2011, 15). Songer and 
Siripurapu (2009, 66) point to the fact that justices themselves deny the importance of 
attitudes in unanimous decisions.
4
 Instead they stress the nature of the cases litigated and 
collegiality (e.g., Schei 2004; 2011). By utilizing a multilevel statistical approach these 
assumptions can be tested for all cases, including both non-unanimous and unanimous 
decisions.  
Different methodological frameworks have been applied to study the decisions and outputs of 
courts, and several competing models orient and account for judicial behavior and decision-
making procedures. In order to assess the state friendly nature of the justices in the Norwegian 
Supreme Court an integrated model of judicial behavior is developed based on legal, 
attitudinal and strategic frameworks. Following Gibson (1983, 32), in order to understand 
decision making, the models must be capable of incorporating effects operating at various 
                                                          
2
 Sunde (2011a, 6) clarifies the distinction between civil and criminal cases in the Norwegian legal system: “The 
Norwegian categorization of civil and criminal cases are the same as in the English common law tradition, where 
the category civil law embraces all law (including administrative law, labour law, trade law and civil procedural 
law) that is not criminal law and criminal procedural law.” 
3
 The term ‘judge’ is used to denote a person presiding over court proceedings at any level in the judicial 
hierarchy, while the denomination ‘justice’ is used specifically for members of a Supreme Court. 
4





levels of the analysis. Individuals make decisions, but they do so within the context of group, 
institutional and environmental constraints. 
The inherent hierarchical structure of the judicial decision-making process enables the 
utilization of a multilevel framework. A two-level hierarchical generalized linear model with 
a latent variable approach where judges are nested in panels will form the framework for the 
analysis. The aim is to model the effect of judge-level and panel-level explanatory factors on 
the probability of a justice voting for or against the state. In a multilevel analysis the variance 
explained by the hierarchical structure of judicial decisions can be assessed and accounted for. 
Within this framework legal, attitudinal and strategic approaches to studies of judicial 
behavior can be integrated in a single model without violating the assumptions inherent in a 
single-level analysis.    
1.3 Overview of the thesis 
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter two provides a brief introduction 
to the concept of judicial behavior and how it applies to the Norwegian legal system. In the 
next chapter, three theoretical models forming a framework for an integrated model of judicial 
behavior are outlined. Chapter four presents the organization and procedure of the Supreme 
Court, in addition to its political function. At the end of this chapter several hypotheses are 
established based on the theoretical framework provided in chapter three and a discussion of 
the state friendly nature of the Supreme Court. Chapter five and six outlines the statistical 
method and data used in the analysis. In chapter five the benefits of multilevel analyses are 
assessed and a two-level hierarchical generalized linear model based on a latent variable 
approach is developed. Chapter six provides a description of the judicial decisions data used 
in the analysis and outlines the operationalization of the explanatory variables and control 
variables. In chapter seven the analysis and results are presented and discussed and it is 
asserted that a hierarchical analysis is required for studies of judicial decisions. Finally, 




Chapter 2 - Relevance of judicial behavior 
Research on the Norwegian judicial system has been limited in scope from a political science 
point of view and besides a few, but notable, exceptions; contributions to the literature on the 
Norwegian Supreme court have been provided by legal scholars. Historically, comparative 
politics scholars in Europe have tended to ignore law and courts when studying government 
institutions (Stone Sweet 2000, 2). However, recent developments in the use of statistical 
methods and the availability of extensive data on Supreme Court decisions have the potential 
to yield more realistic and effective analyses of judicial behavior. By employing multilevel 
analysis several approaches to judicial behavior can be tested in one single model. This 
strategy also captures the inherent hierarchical structure of the judicial system. The ability to 
discern a more nuanced view of the Court with regard to the factors affecting the votes of the 
justices through the use of new forms of analyses will benefit the development of research on 
judicial decisions in Norway. 
2.1 Judicial behavior  
Being one of the three branches of government it is curious that only a selected few study the 
Norwegian Supreme Court from a political science perspective. The judges themselves 
acknowledge that ideological preferences as well as personal preferences are elements 
inherent in the Court’s decision-structure; affecting the justices’ case assessments both in 
trivial and important cases (Grendstad, Shaffer, and Waltenburg 2012b, 240-241). In addition, 
the interactions among the justices can also affect the outcome of judicial decisions. 
Michalsen (2006, 90, author's translation) points out that “the Supreme Court is first and 
foremost a collegial court”. The Court consists of individuals who interrelate within a 
framework determined by a number of different factors, including, but not limited to, 
individual, collegial and institutional factors (Sunde 2012, 196).  
Through the ongoing internationalization and the more general judicialization of the 
Norwegian society there has been a shift in the balance of power from the legislature to the 
courts.
5
 Judicialization of politics implies either “a transfer of decision-making rights from the 
legislature, the cabinet, or the civil service to the courts”, or “the spread of judicial decision-
making methods outside the judicial province” (Vallinder 1994, 91). It can also be conceived 
                                                          
5
 For a detailed overview of these processes see chapter six in the final report from the Power and Democracy 




of as a process in which judicial actors, procedures and categories gradually dominate or 
displace legislative politics (Rehder 2007, 18).  
Judges face new academic challenges as new areas are regulated by law and more social 
issues are judicialized (Skoghøy 2011b, 8). The Supreme Court’s function is maintained and 
protected through the judges’ work and decisions (Grendstad et al. 2012b, 241). With political 
power being transferred from elected officials to appointed officials, the study of courts from 
a political science perspective is indeed highly relevant. Especially when one considers the 
potential effect personal preferences and attributes can have on case outcomes when 
combined with the collegial configuration of the Supreme Court. Legal scholars are also of 
the opinion that the Supreme Court should be studied by scholars from other backgrounds 
than that of law in order to discern a more nuanced picture of the Court (Sunde 2011b; 2012, 
171).  
The shift of power from the political sphere to that of the courts follows as a consequence of 
an ongoing internationalization of the judicial sphere. Through the incorporation of central 
human rights conventions into Norwegian law and the ratification of the EEA (European 
Economic Area) and EFTA (European Free Trade Association) agreements the courts have 
gained an increased amount of influence due to the vertical shift of power from the legislative 
branch of government to supranational agencies.
6
 At first glance this vertical transition of 
sovereignty can look as if it constrains and limits the Supreme Court’s influence. However, 
the ratification of international conventions opens up for a significant control over the 
legislature by the courts. When international conventions are applied to retain, modify or 
supersede Norwegian law, it is the courts – and in final instance the Supreme Court – that 
decides the effect of laws passed by the Norwegian Parliament (Schei 2011, 326-327).  
“Legalization of politics may empty the political sphere and thus produce democratic deficit” 
(Gloppen et al. 2010, 179, note 13). If that is the case the political preferences of the judges 
will be vital in understanding political processes much the same way as the preferences of the 
members of parliament are. The judicialization of politics, according to Ferejohn (2002, 63-
64), tends to produce the politicization of courts. The result being that judicial decision-
making has a propensity to become politics carried out by other means. Were law to be 
created mainly through precedent the political preferences of the judges would have to be 
                                                          
6




made clear in advance. Research on judicial behavior thus has the ability to shed light on a 
central political process, ensuring its transparency (Sunde 2012, 169). The Norwegian 
Supreme Court “pronounces judgment in the final instance” (Norges Høyesterett 2011). 
Consequently it is not only the case in question that is left for the Supreme Court to decide, 





Chapter 3 - Models of decision-making – a theoretical overview 
This chapter provides an introduction to various approaches for studying judicial decisions. 
After explaining the role of courts with regard to their accountability functions in 
representative democracies an overview and description of legal, attitudinal and strategic 
frameworks for studying judicial decisions are provided. Following the overview of the 
different models an integrated hierarchical model for analysis of judicial behavior is 
established.  
3.1 Accountability functions of courts 
Accountability structures and relationships are integral to modern representative democracies, 
and courts form a central part of these structures through mechanisms of vertical and 
horizontal control.
7
 Gloppen et al. (2010, 13) defines political accountability as “a relationship 
between two sets of actors; citizens, who are the principals with whom legitimate political 
authority ultimately rests, and the rulers, who are their agents”. Political accountability is also 
frequently termed vertical accountability to refer to the hierarchical relationship between the 
people and the ruler. The main mechanism available to citizens for exercising vertical 
accountability, also known as popular control, is the election of representatives. In 
parliamentary systems elections are held for the legislature, which then selects the executive. 
The judicial branch is appointed by the executive (sometimes in cooperation with the 
legislature). In presidential systems both the legislature and the executive are elected. 
Judiciaries are rarely directly elected, and are usually appointed in a similar manner to that of 
a parliamentary system (Gloppen et al. 2010, 11-16).
8
   
Courts regulate interactions of ordinary citizens and constrain exercises of authority by 
political officials and institutions (Shepsle and Bonchek 1997, 412). “The courts 
accountability function refers to their ability to prevent illegitimate use of political power 
(Gloppen 2004, 112, emphasis in original).” Courts provide an avenue of vertical 
accountability by enabling individuals and groups to use litigation to protect and advance 
their rights and interests. The relative importance of this function depends on the effectiveness 
                                                          
7
 Accountability is considered in terms of the definition provided by Grant and Keohane (2005, 29); namely that 
accountability “implies that some actors have the right to hold other actors to a set of standards, to judge whether 
they have fulfilled their responsibilities in light of these standards, and to impose sanctions if they determine that 
these responsibilities have not been met”. For a detailed overview of accountability functions, see chapter two in 
Gloppen et al. (2010), Gloppen, Gargarella, and Skaar (2004) and Grant and Keohane (2005). 
8




of other channels of popular control. Courts are also crucial to the system of horizontal 
accountability between state institutions, and they hold other state actors to the law and the 
constitution.  
Horizontal accountability, in short, deals with accountability relationships between different 
state institutions (Gloppen et al. 2010, 13). O’Donnell (1999, 38 quoted in Gloppen et al. 
2010, 14) provides a well-known definition of horizontal accountability: “[it is] [t]he 
existence of state agencies that are legally enabled and empowered and factually willing and 
able, to take actions that span from routine oversight to criminal sanction or impeachment in 
relation to actions or omissions by other agents or agencies of the state that may be qualified 
as unlawful”. In this capacity the courts also serve to protect channels for vertical popular 
control (Gloppen et al. 2010, 15-16). Thus the relative importance of the vertical control 
functions of the courts depends on how well they serve their role as a horizontal control 
mechanism.  
Following Gloppen et al. (2010, 19), “[t]he assessment of the accountability functions of 
courts requires us not only to examine the concrete behavior and decisions of the courts, but 
also take into consideration whether they actually do what we normatively expect them to 
do”. A variety of approaches have been applied to understand decisions of courts and the 
extent to which they are able to exercise their accountability functions including, but not 
limited to, individual, institutional and legal explanations. The extent to which courts 
contribute toward securing the democratic process depends on the political context and 
democratic challenges in the particular society. If courts fail to serve their democracy-
enhancing role it can potentially have major implications for the entire institutional system 
(Gloppen et al. 2010, 18-21).  
An important function of courts is the sanction of abuse of political power and violation of 
rights. Through litigation individuals and groups might gain political voice, and by securing 
such societal accountability directly or through securing the conditions for such litigation 
courts serve as a protector of minorities against the tyranny of the majority (Gloppen et al. 
2010, 20). Central to this accountability function is the concern of “how to guard the 
guardians” and prevent misuse by the judiciary itself (Gloppen et al. 2010, 21). The 
Norwegian Supreme Court, for example, has a tendency to decide cases in favor of the state at 




of the state without sufficient justification based on the available legal sources and equitable 
considerations, the question that should be asked is whether or not the court is fulfilling its 
role as an accountability structure.
9
 The principle of minority protection is not always adhered 
to when substantial government interests are at stake. Lund (1987, 215, author's translation) 
has noted that “in cases where substantial state interests are involved, and where it concerns 
decisions of government and parliament, one can generally disregard that the courts will rule in 
disfavor of the state”. Research on judicial decisions is one approach which has the ability to 
shed light on what is a central political process, ensuring its transparency (Sunde 2012, 169). 
By analyzing court decisions the accountability function of the Norwegian courts can be 
evaluated, and their effectiveness ensured.  
3.2 Models of decision-making 
Judges are sometimes referred to as legislators in robes. This notion is based on the 
assumption that judges have the opportunity to act on their own personal policy preferences 
when shaping the legal context of a country through their decisions (Shepsle and Bonchek 
1997, 419). Within this framework decisions of judges are, like those of other political actors, 
“a function of what they prefer to do, tempered by what they think they ought to do, but 
constrained by what they perceive is feasible to do” (Gibson 1983, 9). Richards and Kritzer 
(2002, 305) highlights the importance of considering “[w]hether or not courts generally, and 
the Supreme Court specifically, differ from legislative bodies [since it] has major implications 
for how we think about the role of courts and analyze their processes and outputs”. If judges 
are considered to be political actors largely following their ideological preferences a court 
would only differ from a small legislative body “in the selection of its members, its technical 
rules and procedures, and its inability […] to initiate issues to consider” (Richards and Kritzer 
2002, 305). The opposing view is that judicial decision-making has unique characteristics that 
distinguish it from decision making in legislative settings (Lax 2007, 591). Most approaches 
to studies of judicial decisions are situated somewhere between these extremes.   
Different methodological frameworks have been applied to study the decisions and outputs of 
courts, and several competing models orient and account for judicial behavior and decision-
                                                          
9
 Equitable considerations (reelle hensyn) allows courts to adapt the law to changing social and political 
conditions (Grendstad, Shaffer, and Waltenburg 2010, 76). They are a heterogeneous group of arguments that are 
relevant when one considers legal questions. These arguments do not directly relate to the law, preparatory work, 
customary law, precedent, or other bounded categories (Kjønstad 2006, 358). It “involves the making of 
decisions by reference not only to predefined rules but also to policy considerations such as utility and fairness” 




making procedures. Most approaches to judicial behavior agree that justices consider the facts 
of the case and the available legal sources. The degree to which these legal sources actually 
affect the decisions of judges is disputed. Scholars typically divide the study of judicial 
decisions into two large categories: legalism and realism. Legalists would argue that the law is 
essential for understanding court decisions, and that judges create and apply legal rules 
through methods that are objective, impersonal, and politically neutral (Epstein and Jacobi 
2010, 342-343).
10
 In this view “[a] judge makes policy by resolving legal disputes, […], by 
deciding cases that present themselves as bundles of facts (Lax 2007, 591).” 
Contrary to legalism, realists contend that the facts of the case and relevant legal sources can 
be shaped to conform to the outcome a judge desires based on her ideological and personal 
attributes (e.g., Segal and Spaeth 2002; Tate 1981). These attitudinal approaches tend to view 
judges as “single-minded seekers of legal policy” (George and Epstein 1992, 325). Diverting 
somewhat from the attitudinal framework, advocates of rational choice paradigms assert  that 
“judges do not make decisions in a vacuum, but rather take into account the preferences and 
likely actions of other relevant actors, including their colleagues, their judicial superiors, and 
members of the other branches of government” (Epstein and Jacobi 2010, 341). Institutions 
provide the structure within which decision-making occurs, thereby affecting the choices that 
can be made (Maltzman, Spriggs, and Wahlbeck 2000, 13).
11
  
Attempts have also been made to reconcile the various strands of legalism and realism in 
integrated models of judicial behavior. Wahlbeck, Spriggs, and Maltzman (1999, 507) 
conclude that the willingness to disagree with the majority’s legal reasoning in Supreme Court 
decisions stems from a combination of attitudinal, strategic and institutional factors. In this 
view Supreme Court justices are rational actors who pursue their policy goals within 
constraints. Brace and Hall (1993, 917) support this view, suggesting that “judicial decisions 
are the result of a complex interaction of preferences, rules, and structures”. By omitting 
institutional features models of judicial behavior are rendered simplistic and incomplete 
(Brace and Hall 1997, 1207).  
                                                          
10
 Legal models are often ill defined and include various, and often contradicting, theoretical approaches. 
However, all legal models are based to some extent on doctrinalism, reasoned judgment and adhere to the 
concept of “rule of law” (Cross 1997, 263). 
11
 The concept of an institution is viewed in terms of the definition provided by North (1990, 13, quoted in 
Maltzman et al. 2000, 12-13): “Institutions are the rules of the game in society or, more formally, they are the 




In the following sections three different approaches to the study of judicial decisions – legal, 
attitudinal and strategic – are accounted for and discussed, before a suggestion for a general 
model of judicial behavior is outlined. The models considered below will form the theoretical 
basis for the analysis of state friendliness in the Norwegian Supreme Court and the 
development of a hierarchical model for analysis of Supreme Court decisions. 
3.2.1 The legal model 
The legal model in its simplest form can be viewed as mechanical jurisprudence, which posits 
a single correct answer to legal questions that judges are to find (Segal and Spaeth 2002, 48). 
This is a naïve form of the model, mainly applied by the proponents of the attitudinal 
approach to frame the Supreme Court decision-making research question as law versus the 
political attitudes of the justices, whereas legal scholars usually rely on more sophisticated 
approaches (Kritzer and Richards 2005, 33). Cross (1997, 255) provides a general description 
of the classical legal model in formalistic terms: “the model suggests that the path of law can 
be identified through reasoned analysis of factors internal to the law”. Thus, court decisions 
are structured by establishing what case factors are relevant for decision-making, and the 
decisions are substantially influenced by the facts of the case and how they relate to the 
relevant law, legislative intent, and precedent (Richards and Kritzer 2002, 305). Generally, the 
legal model holds “that judicial votes result from the application of use of professional 
interpretative techniques, or modes of reasoning from legal principles as taught in law 
schools, to the interpretation of various sorts of legal texts” (Brisbin 1996, 1004).  
Positivist, or mechanical, approaches to law are no longer adhered to by most contemporary 
scholars (Cross 1997, 255; Tiller and Cross 2006). Decisions are not considered to be solely 
based on “reasoned response to reasoned argument” (Shapiro 1987, 737) yielding “legal 
reasoning that can generate outcomes in controversial disputes independent of the political or 
economic ideology of the judge” (Johnson 1984, 252). Legal scholars recognize that judicial 
ideology influences judicial decisions (Tiller and Cross 2006, 520). This notion rejects the 
basics of positivism, which cannot admit legal reasoning based upon ideological inclinations 
irrespective of legal structures (Cross 1997, 261).
12
 Newer schools of thought, such as legal 
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realism and Critical Legal Studies, differ from the classical positivist approach in that they 
recognize the effect of judicial ideology (Tiller and Cross 1999, 217).  
The adjudication of cases on Norwegian Supreme Court is an example of what can be 
considered an approach based on a legal realism adopted from the historical formalistic 
approach (Askeland 2003).
13
 There is a general consensus within the Norwegian legal 
community that judges – through their personality and values – are affected by the 
environment and the part of society he or she belongs to (Schei 2011, 17-18). Norwegian legal 
professionals would argue that it is possible to arrive at different conclusions while still 
adhering to the law if the authoritative legal sources do not provide a clear-cut answer to the 
dispute in question (Skoghøy 2011a, 713). In Smith’s (1975, 316) view, cases adjudicated by 
the Supreme Court should offer several different solutions that are legally justifiable, 
otherwise the cases should normally not have appeared before the Court. When the premise of 
the courts is to provide a convincing decision based on juridical arguments the reality is that 
there is hardly any limit to the variety of results that can be justified with legal reasoning 
(Lund 1987, 216-217). The extensive use of equitable considerations in decisions of the 
Supreme Court – “to ensure a fair outcome” (Grendstad et al. 2011b, 6) – is a prime example 
of the considerations central to the concept of  legal realism. 
An inherent issue with the legal model of decision making, relayed by Segal and Spaeth 
(2002, 86), is that “by being able to explain ‘everything’, in the end it explains nothing”. If 
various aspects of the legal model can support either side of a given dispute and the quality of 
these positions cannot be validly and reliably measured a priori, then the legal model hardly 
satisfies as an explanation of Supreme Court decisions (Segal and Spaeth 2002, 86). 
Advocates of the attitudinal approach points out that justices create the law that guides their 
own decision-making, so the law itself is a reflection of the justices’ attitudes (Richards and 
Kritzer 2002, 306). The cases appearing before appellate courts are principal in nature, and 
“[b]ecause clear cases do not represent a significant share of the disputes actually adjudicated 
by judicial bodies, legal rules cannot be a major determinant of judicial behaviour” (Dyevre 
2010, 312).  
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However, as Friedman (2006, 264) phrases it, “the question is not so much whether law plays 
a role, as what role it plays”. To study the behavior of judges one has to assert whether judges 
are just like any other political actors or if law might constrain their behavior. Political 
science has a tendency to trivialize law, and in many instances social scientists have 
disregarded or ignored legal doctrine completely (Friedman 2006; Tiller and Cross 2006, 
520). This is based on the aforementioned assumption assumption that the law, as understood 
by legal academics, does not really matter to judges (Tiller and Cross 2006, 522). Citing Lax 
(2011, 132): “the accoutrements of law are not just superfluous details to be set aside by 
modelers and other sophisticated political scientists; the idiosyncrasies of legal policy making 
are critical for building useful theories, be they formal or informal”. By disregarding law one 
essentially refutes the premise of the entire structure of the legal community and the nature of 
the judicial process; namely that law does matter (Friedman 2006; Gillman 2001, 466).
14
 
Thinking about judges as political creatures does not obviate the need to consider cases and 
rules (Lax 2007, 592). 
When specifying a legal model of decision-making one has to consider law within a larger 
framework rather than viewing it as nothing more than mechanical jurisprudence. Critics of 
the approach taken by Segal and Spaeth claim that they present an antiquated perspective of 
legal reasoning that incorrectly suggests how justices should automatically adhere to prior 
controlling precedents (e.g., Bartels 2009; Friedman 2006; Gillman 2001). Rosenberg (1994, 
7) label Segal and Spaeth’s legal model a “straw person”, and claim that in virtually every 
area where Segal and Spaeth find support for the attitudinal model a properly understood legal 
model would produce similar results. Tiller and Cross (2006, 532-533) calls for greater 
attention to the core elements of legal analysis and how they relate to a more sophisticated 
model of judicial behavior. It is widely believed that personal elements are constrained by 
professional obligations and jurisprudential schools of thought (e.g., Gillman 2001, 466). 
Affiliation with the judiciary and their training as lawyers are other factors considered to be 
possible constraints in addition to law itself (Benesh and Spaeth 2007, 755). The legal view 
recognizes that law is not everything, but still claim that it is something important (e.g., 
George and Epstein 1992; Lax 2011; Richards and Kritzer 2002; Tiller and Cross 2006, 522). 
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3.2.2 The attitudinal model 
In contrast to the legal model, the attitudinal model claims that judges are seekers of policy, 
and make decisions in light of their brute policy preferences (Benesh and Spaeth 2007, 756; 
Dyevre 2010, 300; Segal and Spaeth 2002). “The attitudinal model implies that a change in 
judicial personnel may bring about a change in judicial policies, thus inviting those who hold 
the power to appoint judges to pick individuals that share their policy agenda (Dyevre 2010, 
301).” The model contends that the political attitudes of the judges are the most important 
influence on the votes of the judges (Songer and Siripurapu 2009, 66). When deciding a 
dispute the judges view the facts of the case in light of their own ideological attitudes and 
values. Hence, as identified by Grendstad et al. (2011b), the attitudinal model would argue 
that when presented with the same legal facts, two justices can arrive at different conclusions 
because different ideological and attitudinal preferences informed their decision. This notion 
undermines the claims in legal thought about the constraining influence of law (Friedman 
2006, 264). 
The clear presence of some ideological factors in decision-making does not, however, prove 
that they are the only factors present. Both the attitudinal and the legal models may influence 
judicial decisions (Cross 1997, 309). The idea of underlying values shaping the decisions 
justices make is integral to both attitudinal and legal views – they differ on which values drive 
decision-making (Bailey and Maltzman 2008, 370). According to Richards and Kritzer (2002, 
307), “attitudes influence the development of law, but law can also affect the decisions of the 
Court [through processes that are not purely attitudinal]”. How to measure the influence of 
law is a recurring question in quantitative research on courts. Lax (2011, 133) holds that 
“[j]udicial behavior can be consistent with legal theory in form and function, while consistent 
with political accounts of the incentives faced by judges”.  In a similar manner, Bartels (2009, 
475) claim that the effect of law is often highly nuanced and difficult to validate with social 
science research designs. 
Segal and Spaeth (2002) suggest that four factors allow Supreme Court justices to decide 
cases almost exclusively on the basis of their ideological preferences: (1) the Supreme Court 
justices do not face electoral and political accountability; (2) they have no ambition for higher 
office; (3) the Supreme Court is the court of last resort; and (4) legal rules governing decision 




contains a deceptively simple logic: “justices come to the Supreme Court with their 
ideological preferences fully formed and, in light of contextual case facts these preferences 
cast overwhelming influence on their decision making” (Unah and Hancock 2006, 296, citing 
Segal and Spaeth 1993). Thus, according to Unah and Hancock (2006, 296), the attitudinal 
model is a complete and adequate model of Supreme Court behavior.
15
  
Building on a slightly different framework than the earlier versions of the attitudinal 
approach,
16
 the theoretical base of the attitudinal model as articulated by Segal and Spaeth 
(2002) nonetheless includes two very important links to its sociological and psychological 
roots:  
“First, the attitudinal model continues to view the votes of the justices as shaped by forces (in particular, 
preferences) exogenous to the strategic context of the Court. Second, the attitudinal approach continues 
to view individuals as the analytical building blocks and outcomes as the aggregated preferences of the 
Court majority (Maltzman et al. 2000, 12).”  
There is an important aspect relating to the first link that is worth noting, namely that the 
model in its pure form is limited to the decisions on the merits. In other areas attitudinalists 
expect that attitudes will be a crucial factor shaping decisions, but not the only factor (Segal 
and Spaeth 2002, 96). The notion of the attitudinal model in its pure form only being 
applicable in the decisions on the merits is contested. Other scholars have interpreted the 
model as attempting to explain more than justices’ final votes on the merits (Knight, 1994 
cited in Maltzman et al. 2000, 10, note 5). 
Analyses of judicial behavior applying attitudinal models tend to view courts as “a 
conglomeration of individual judges” (Rehder 2007, 12). Individual decisions are explained in 
terms of policy preferences, values and attitudes. One can view the relationship between 
judges and their appointing authority in terms of a principal-agent framework: justices 
become independent of those actors who appointed them when they receive life tenure, and as 
a result the principal can no longer control his agent. In light of the four factors identified by 
Segal and Spaeth (2002) outlined above, personal preferences are consequently the most 
important variables in explaining judicial behavior (Rehder 2007, 12). A substantial amount 
of research supports the basic proposition of the attitudinal model – that “the ideology of the 
justices drive their decisions” (Segal and Spaeth 2002, 433). Indeed, Pinello (1999) found that 
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ideology was a statistically significant determinant of decisions for every level of courts 
through a meta-analysis of 84 available comparative studies.   
The attitudinal perspective advocated since the late 1970s suggests that preferences, not roles 
or backgrounds, shape behavior. However, the impact of personal attributes, or background 
characteristics, has also been shown to exhibit significant effects on judicial decisions (Brace 
and Hall 1993, 918). Historically, personal attributes were conceptualized as an indirect link 
to voting behavior (e.g., Gibson 1983; Tate 1981; Tate and Handberg 1991). More recently 
they have been identified as having a direct influence on judicial decisions (e.g., Brace and 
Hall 1995, 11). The works that have associated various types of background characteristics of 
judges with their voting behavior are closely related to attitudinal studies. They indicate that 
ideological values and personal preferences can be conceived of as being shaped by personal 
attributes (Brace and Hall 1993, 918). Brace and Hall (1995, 11; 1997, 1213) point out that 
Tate has suggested that attitudes and attributes are related in the United States Supreme Court 
to the extent that operationally they may be interchangeable. Consequently, personal attributes 
have been used as surrogates for justices’ ideological preferences (Brace and Hall 1997, 
1213). While some would argue that personal attributes constitute a separate model there is 
not, from a theoretical point of view, compelling reasons for separating the concepts of 
attitudes and attributes As an example: when explaining state friendliness on the Norwegian 
Supreme Court the effect of personal attributes is expected to yield equal, if not stronger, 
significant effects than ideological attitudes, based on the results of previous studies (e.g., 
Jacobsen 2011). 
3.2.3 The strategic interaction model 
Empirical evidence suggests that strategic accounts of judicial decision-making can explain 
behavior that may not otherwise be understood as driven solely by attitudinal concerns 
(Hettinger, Lindquist, and Martinek 2004, 124). In contrast to the attitudinal framework, 
strategic accounts belong to “a class of nonparametric rational choice models, as they assume 
that goal-directed actors – including judges – operate in a strategic or interdependent context” 
(Epstein and Jacobi 2010, 343). The strategic approach recognizes that the behavior of 
individual justices is shaped in part by the actions and preferences of their brethren in addition 
to the institutional environment in which decisions are rendered. It differs from the behavioral 




and that the individual action can be aggregated to account for political outcomes” (Maltzman 
et al. 2000, 13).  
The development of the strategic approach can be traced back to the application of rational 
choice paradigms to legal questions in the works of Schubert, Pritchett and Murphy in the 
early 1960s. Most scholars, however, remained committed to theories drawn from social 
psychology rather than economics, and by the 1980s predictions from variants of the social-
psychological models predominated thinking about law and courts (Epstein and Knight 
2000).
17
 With the number of strategic accounts applied to understand judicial politics 
increasing steadily throughout the 1990s, Epstein and Knight (2000, 652) asserted that the 
field of judicial politics was undergoing a “sea change”. In the first decade of the 2000s 
strategic accounts have been the dominant theme in literature on judicial decisions, and 
scholars have theorized that judges may evidence strategic behavior in a variety of contexts 
(Epstein and Jacobi 2010; Hettinger et al. 2004, 124). 
According to Maltzman et al. (2000, 14), the heart of strategic action is interdependency: 
justices’ choices are shaped by the preferences and likely actions of other relevant actors. 
Bartels (2009, 474) acknowledges the relative importance of institutions when explaining that 
“[l]egislators, judges, bureaucrats, voters and other actors make decisions within an 
institutional context defined by formal and informal rules that constrain individual discretion 
and ultimately shape actors’ choices”. Attitudinalists, in contrast to those adhering to rational 
choice, would dispute the idea of Supreme Court justices being constrained by their 
institutional environment (e.g., Segal and Spaeth 2002). However, as Richards and Kritzer 
(2002, 305) note, freedom from review or electoral accountability does not prevent the 
justices from erecting other constraints that shape their decision-making process. Proponents 
of strategic interaction would agree that “despite the importance of ideology, the collegial 
context in which judges decide cases has a significant effect on how their preferences are 
expressed”  (Meinke and Scott 2007, 909). 
Dyevre (2010) provides a distinction between two institutional, or strategic, models, which 
can be useful for establishing strategic frameworks: the institutional internalist model and the 
institutional externalist model. The institutional internalist model of judicial decision-making 
can be viewed as a collegial game (Dyevre 2010, 302). Consequently, the most important 
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institutional feature of the Court is its collegial character. In pursuing their policy goals, 
judges are often severely constrained by their institutional environment (Gillman and Clayton 
1999 cited in Dyevre 2010, 302). Institutions provide the structure within which decision-
making occurs and thereby affect the choices that can be made (Maltzman et al. 2000, 13). 
Constraints can thus be imposed on the relevant actors in form of informal or formal rules and 
procedures. These internal rules can constrain the justices’ capacity to translate their 
preferences into legal policy outcomes. As a result, the judges engage in strategic behavior as 
they attempt to shape the Court’s policy output in conformance with their desired policy 
outcome (Maltzman et al. 2000, 14-15).  
The institutional externalist model, as identified by (Dyevre 2010), emphasizes the broader 
institutional context in which courts operate. In this model the hierarchical structure of the 
judiciary is seen as a potential constraint on judges from acting on their own preferences, in 
addition to the influences of other branches of government in the separation-of-powers system 
(Epstein and Jacobi 2010, 350-351). Within this framework, the Supreme Court is in essence 
a political institution interacting with other institutions (Richards and Kritzer 2002, 306). The 
model holds that pressures from outside the legal system can affect case outcomes if the court 
is responsive to the larger political environment (George and Epstein 1992, 325). 
Epstein and Jacobi (2010, 351) point to the fact that some analysts find this level of 
strategizing unnecessary because political actors and judges share the same political 
preferences. This line of thought can be traced back to as early as 1957 when Robert A. Dahl 
wrote that “[…] the policy views dominant on the Court are never for long out of line with the 
policy views dominant among the lawmaking majorities […]” (Dahl 2001, 570, honorary 
reprint). If ruling regimes have the opportunity to appoint new members to appellate courts 
every few years, it is unrealistic to suppose the court would stand against any major 
alternatives sought by a lawmaking majority. However, empirical studies have failed to 
validate this notion (Epstein and Jacobi 2010, 352).
18
 
Ferejohn and Pasquino (2004, 1692) have argued that the importance of judicial deliberation 
constitutes a distinctive feature of the European model of constitutional adjudication. This 
sentiment is based on the closed deliberations of many European high courts where oral 
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arguments are not used. Proceedings in the Norwegian Supreme Court, in contrast, are always 
oral in cases heard in division, Grand Chamber and plenary session (The Supreme Court of 
Norway 2007). Following Ferejohn and Pasquino (2004, 1697), “[i]nternal deliberation if 
fundamentally about deciding what the court should do: is it aimed at persuading fellow 
Justices or being persuaded by them to agree on a common action”. Dyevre (2010, 303) points 
out that “any account of judicial decision-making in terms of collegial interactions and 
internal strategies is bound to remain speculative”. There is, however, a substantial amount on 
research on the U.S. Supreme Court and the U.S. Courts of Appeals which suggests that 
collegial politics is highly relevant for analyzing judicial decisions. Strategic models are also 
concerned with the effect the constraint of legal variables and other institutional rules and 
procedures can have on case outcomes and the votes of the individual justices. 
3.2.4 Toward an integrated model – law, attitudes and institutions 
Gibson (1983, 32-33) proposed the integration of individual and contextual theories of 
judicial behavior to bridge the micro-macro gap and develop cross-level models.  
Comprehensive models can be developed by incorporating influences from various levels, 
which in turn has the potential to yield better predictions and a higher level of explanatory 
power for judicial decisions. Brace and Hall (1997, 1207) provides a rationale for developing 
more complex models when stating that “judicial decisions are considerably more than the 
simple product of the cases at hand, the judges rendering decisions, or the environments 
within which courts operate”. In an earlier paper they identify that decisions are not merely 
the collective expression of individual preferences or the application of legal rules, but rather 
a result of a complex interaction of preferences, rules and structures (Brace and Hall 1993, 
916-917).  
The reconciliation of various attitudinal and institutionalist approaches is also considered by 
Dyevre (2010). He outlines a general theory of judicial behavior, incorporating the competing 
accounts of attitudinal and institutional approaches from both the United States and European 
literature within a hierarchical framework. The analysis of state friendly voting on the 
Norwegian Supreme Court will also be based on the concept of a hierarchical framework. An 
extension to the framework suggested by Dyevre is the inclusion of legal aspects of judicial 
decision-making. Rather than trying to establish a general theory, the aim of this thesis is to 




Hall (1993, 917) serve as a point of departure for the development of an integrated model. 
They identify four categories of major variables that must be included in an analysis of 
judicial decisions: justices’ personal preferences, case characteristics, institutional 
arrangements and environmental characteristics.  
A two-level hierarchical model will form the framework for the analysis of state friendly 
voting. The votes of the justices will serve as the dependent variable, indicating whether they 
vote for or against the state. Consequently, the first level will include variables identifying 
different characteristics of the judges. The second level will include variables related to cases 
and panels. Within this framework the three models outlined in subsections 3.2.1 through 
3.2.3 can be tested together in a single hierarchical model. The attitudinal model can be fitted 
to level one and the strategic model and legal model can be fitted to the second level.
19
 
Hypotheses and theoretical expectations for the analysis are established in the next chapter 
after an overview of the organization and procedure of the Norwegian Supreme Court and an 
introduction to the state friendly hypothesis has been presented.  
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Chapter 4 - A state friendly court – organization and procedure of the Supreme Court 
In light of the overview of different theoretical models presented in the previous chapter this 
chapter provides an introduction to the role of the courts in the Norwegian legal system and 
the organization and procedure of the Supreme Court. Following the overview of the Supreme 
Court an introduction to legal culture and sources of law theory is provided, before the 
political function of the Court is discussed. The overview of the political function of the 
Supreme Court is relevant to the discussion of the state friendly nature of the Court presented 
in section 4.5. In conclusion several hypotheses are established based on the theoretical 
framework outlined chapter three and the state friendly hypothesis discussed in sub-section 
4.5.1.  
4.1 Norwegian Courts  
Norwegian courts, represented by the Supreme Court at the pinnacle of the legal system, 
constitute one of three juxtaposed state powers. Constitutional theory states that each branch 
of government – the executive, the legislature, and the judiciary – should be responsible for a 
segmented area of political power. However, a more realistic understanding, as identified by 
Grendstad et al. (2011b, 5), is that these branches share power, and that their power overlaps. 
Central to the division of power is the independence of the courts, as stated in the sixth 
principle drafted by the Constitutional Committee in 1814 (Stortinget 2012b). Through court 
developed authority to review the constitutionality of legislation and the legality of 
administrative decisions, the position of the courts relative to the other branches of 
government has been expanded from the original authority provided by the Constitution.  
Magnussen (2005, 69) defines the premise and role of the court system in the following terms: 
“Legitimacy, confidence and autonomy in the court system are dependent on people trusting 
the institution to make decisions based on predefined legal rules. Simultaneously, confidence 
in the system is also dependent on the system’s capability to adjust to changes in values in 
society.” Courts do not only have to make decisions based on predefined legal rules, in 
addition they have to adjust these rules according to the general perception in society of what 
these rules should constitute. They are also responsible, through the function of horizontal 
accountability, to hold other state actors to the law and the constitution. 
In the Norwegian legal system the role of the courts is primarily to resolve disputes and settle 




branches of government, and it is their right and duty to review the constitutionality of 
legislation when those questions present themselves in the cases adjudicated. In addition to 
providing constitutional review the courts can review legislation conflicting with human 
rights legislation given precedent over other Norwegian laws. Administrative decisions to 
secure individuals’ protection accorded by the law are also reviewed by the courts, which is of 
more practical importance than constitutional review and review of legislation in conflict with 
laws given precedent.
20
 The control functions exercised by the Norwegian courts are 
substantial, and the state is often a party to the proceedings in the cases adjudicated. This 
underlines the need of the courts’ independence from the executive and legislative branches of 
government (Schei 2012, 21-25).
21
 Norwegian courts exercise a graded constitutional 
protection, where individual and political rights and freedoms are protected more strongly 
than economic rights and positions. The Constitution and judicial review serve as safeguards 
for individuals and minorities (Smith 2000, 10).
22
 
4.2 Organization and procedure of the Supreme Court 
Positioned at the summit of the Norwegian legal system the main task, or function, of the 
Supreme Court is “to ensure uniformity of legal process and to contribute to the resolution of 
matters on which the law is unclear” (The Supreme Court of Norway 2007). In addition to 
these tasks the Supreme Court has “a responsibility for the evolution of the law – within the 
framework of existing legislation – as and when required by new societal problems” (The 
Supreme Court of Norway 2007). In the following paragraphs the organization and procedure 
of the Court are outlined before the legal sources applied by the Court and the political 
function of the Court are discussed in sections 4.3 and 4.4, respectively.  
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4.2.1 Organization of the Supreme Court 
The Norwegian Supreme Court is an appellate court of last resort with discretionary 
jurisdiction.
23
 Article 88 of the Norwegian Constitution provides that “[t]he Supreme Court 
pronounces judgment in the final instance” (Stortinget 2012a).
24
 Acting as a court of last 
resort, the Supreme Court only adjudicates cases where the decision will have an impact 
beyond the case in question (Schei 2010, 13; 2011, 7). Historically, according to Sunde 
(2011a, 1-2), the Supreme Court has been the focal point in the Norwegian legal system 
mainly due to two factors: the pyramid shape of the legal system, and the long absence of 
academic law. With only two specialized courts next to the district courts in the first instance, 
only one specialized court next to the Courts of Appeal in the second instance, and only one 
Supreme Court with general jurisdiction in the last instance, the organization of the 
Norwegian legal system entrusts the Supreme Court with significant judicial power.
25
 Rulings 
of the Court have had the role of precedent due to the long absence of academic law that 
could compete with the Supreme Court as a source to insight into law together with the 
Court’s position at the pinnacle of the legal system. Consequently, being “[v]iewed as a 
legitimate norm producing body in the Norwegian legal system, the Supreme Court has also 
been studied as such” (Sunde 2011a, 2). 
Individual cases appearing before the Norwegian Supreme Court are heard by five justices, 
and the Court works in two parallel and equal divisions (Norges Høyesterett 2011). In cases 
concerning abandoning existing precedence, entangled legal questions and the relationship 
between law and constitution the Supreme Court have since 1926 been supposed to meet in 
plenary session referred to as Plenum. The list was expanded in 2005 to include cases where a 
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statute seems to be in conflict with treaties ratified by the Parliament. When cases of this type 
have been less grave, the Court has since 2008 met in a Grand Chamber consisting of eleven 
judges (Sunde 2011a, 8).  
Currently there are 19 judges on the Court in addition to the Chief Justice. Appointments to 
the Supreme Court are made by the sitting cabinet – formally by the King in Council – after 
recommendation from the Judicial Appointments Board and a recommendation from the 
Supreme Court.
26
 The Judicial Appointments Board was established in 2002 as an 
independent agency under the Norwegian Courts Administration (Skoghøy 2011b, 18).
27
 
Before the establishment of Courts Administration the central administration of Norwegian 
courts was managed by the Court division of the Ministry of Justice.
28
 Following the 
evaluation of the Norwegian court system in Domstolene i samfunnet (NOU 1999) and the 
proposition for reform of the central administration of Norwegian courts given in Om lov om 
endringer i domstolloven m.m. (den sentrale domstoladministrasjon og dommernes 
arbeidsrettslige stilling) (Ot.prp.nr.44 2000-2001), the Norwegian Courts Administration was 




Prior to 2002 the Ministry of Justice obtained recommendations from an independent advisory 
agency before new appointments to the lower courts.
30
 For appointments to the Supreme 
Court the only independent advice was an unofficial oral brief presented to the Minister of 
Justice by the Chief Justice after consultation with the other members of the Court 
(Ot.prp.nr.44 2000-2001, 125). With the establishment of the Judicial Appointments Board in 
2002 the advisory procedure was expanded to include appointments to the Supreme Court.
31
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 “The Judicial Appointments Board” is the official translation of the agency’s Norwegian name 
“Innstillingsrådet for Dommere” provided by the Norwegian Courts Administration (Domstol.no 2012a). 
Grendstad et al. (2011b) employ the translation “Advisory Council for the Appointment of Judges”, which does 
offer a better translation seeing that the agency only provides recommendations and does not actually partake in 
the appointment process. To avoid confusion, however, all translations of Norwegian names in the thesis are the 
official translations provided by the agencies websites unless otherwise noted. E.g., supra note 25. 
27
 The changes to the Courts of Justice Act and the establishment of the Judicial Appointments Board were made 
in 2001, but did not take effect until late 2002. For an overview of the procedural arrangements of the 
Appointments Board see Innstillingsrådet for dommere (2012). 
28
 The Ministry of Justice was renamed Ministry of Justice and Public Security (Justis- og Beredskaps-
departementet) in 2012. For the sake of simplicity, Ministry of Justice is used in the text. 
29
 Translations of Norwegian laws are based on the translations compiled by the Faculty of Law Library at the 
University of Oslo (2012). The exceptions are references to the Constitution, which are based on the official 
translation provided by the Norwegian Parliament (2012a). 
30
 This practice was established in the early 1990s (Skoghøy 2011b, 19). 
31




The advice of the Chief Justice is still a part of the process, but is now formalized and made 
public.
32
 Unlike advice given by the leaders of lower courts, which is presented as a written 
statement to the Judicial Appointments Board, the recommendation of the Chief Justice is 
presented directly to the Ministry of Justice after the Appointments Board has made its 
recommendation (Courts of Justice Act, art. 55b).  
Only persons 30 years or above with judicial qualifications can be appointed to the 
Norwegian Supreme Court. The appointment is irremovable, but Supreme Court judges have 
to retire at the age of 70, as all public officials. Judges can be suspended by trial alone, and 
can also be punished through the process of impeachment.
33
 Appointments to the Norwegian 
courts are regulated by articles 54, 55 and 55a-i in the Courts of Justice Act in addition to 
article 21 and article 91 in the Norwegian Constitution.
34
 The Appointments Board consists of 
three judges, a lawyer, one lawyer employed by the government and two members who are 
not lawyers.
35
 Recruitment to available positions on the courts is the domain of the Norwegian 
Courts Administration, the individual courts, and to some extent the Ministry of Justice. The 
Appointments Board only nominates candidates, and does not partake in the recruitment 
process (Innstillingsrådet for dommere 2012, 6).
36
  
Recommendations from the Judicial Appointments Board are based on a principle of broad 
recruitment to ensure the representation of a variety of legal professions on the Court as well 
as to ensure cultural, social, and demographic diversity.
37
 Requirements for Supreme Court 
judges are higher than for judges appointed to the lower and specialized courts. The Judicial 
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 In 2010 Chief Justice Schei decided to make his advice regarding the appointment of new justices’ public. 
Prior to this decision it had not been customary for the Chief Justice to publicize his advice regarding new 
appointments. 
33
 Neither have occurred thus far (Sunde 2011a, 5). 
34
 An extensive overview of the legal premise for appointments can be found in the policy note of the 
Appointments Board (Innstillingsrådet for dommere 2012) and in chapter eight of Om lov om endringer i 
domstolloven m.m. (den sentrale domstoladministrasjon og dommernes arbeidsrettslige stilling) (Ot.prp.nr.44 
2000-2001). 
35
 It should be noted that the members of the Judicial Appointments Board are appointed by the King in Council 
for a four year period with the option of being reappointed for one period.  
36
 The appointment of interim justices does not follow the normal procedure for appointments. Advice on the 
appointment of interim justices is not part of the mandate of the Judicial Appointments Board and the process is 
informal, with the initiative resting with the Supreme Court. Considering that the interim justices can have a 
significant impact on the outcome of decisions, the appointment procedure is questionable. Unlike the regular 
appointments to the Court where the Appointments Board makes an independent recommendation based on a 
selection of suitable candidates, the selection of interim justices is not independent of the Ministry of Justice 
(Smith 2012, 161-162).  
37
 An interesting point mentioned in the policy note of the Appointments Board (2012, 13) is that in the 
appointment process questions relating to the political preferences of the candidates are not asked, and neither 




Appointments Board always provides a list of three nominees, as long as there are three 
qualified candidates, ranked from one to three according to suitability. The King in Council 
may choose amongst all three candidates, but rarely selects number two or number three 
(Innstillingsrådet for dommere 2012).
38
  
4.2.2 Procedure of the Supreme Court 
Justices sit in both divisions of the Supreme Court as well as the Appeals Committee of the 
Supreme Court in accordance with a rotation system. The Appeals Committee was classed as 
a separate court until 2008 when it changed its name from Høyesteretts kjæremålsutvalg to 
Høyesteretts ankeutvalg, and became an integrated part of the Supreme Court after the 
implementation of the new Dispute Act (Lov om mekling og rettergang i sivile tvister). 
Proceedings in the Appeals Committee are in writing, although the implementation of the 
Dispute Act allows for oral proceedings if required. If cases are of a principle character 
requiring oral proceedings they are usually referred to treatment in division (Schei 2008). 
Cases brought before the Committee are heard by three judges (Norges Høyesterett 2011). 
The most experienced judge chairs the Court during proceedings and during the counseling, 
but the Chief Justice chairs the Court if he is among the judges in chamber, and always in 
plenary sessions (Sunde 2011a, 8).  
Right to appeal in civil cases changed with the implementation of the Dispute Act.
39
 The 
Appeals Committee now needs a valid reason for granting appeal whereas before the 
implementation of the act act the Committee needed a valid reason for refuting an appeal 
(Schei 2008; Skoghøy 2008, 488). This change ensures that important cases are granted 
appeal while less important cases are filtered out. As mentioned in chapter two, cases are 
selected because they are complex, controversial, or in some other way considered important. 
Acting as a court of last resort, the Norwegian Supreme Court only adjudicates cases where 
the decision will have an impact beyond the case in question. Cases can also be granted leave 
to appeal if there are circumstantial reasons for a Supreme Court decision on the matter (Schei 
2010, 13; 2011, 7; Skoghøy 2008, 491). The number of cases referred by the Appeals 
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 As of June 2012 this has occurred nine times (Innstillingsrådet for dommere 2012, 51). Articles 55b and 55c of 
the Courts of Justice Act also provides an option for selecting a candidate not nominated by the Appointments 
Board. The King in Council thus has the option to ignore the advice of the Board, but this alternative has never 
been used. 
39





Committee in civil cases has been approximately 14.5 percent of the total number of appeals 
heard by the Committee annually for the past five years (Norges Høyesterett 2012). The 
change from the right to appeal to a system where appeals are granted based on a given set of 
principles ensures a clearer and stronger tie between the role of the Supreme Court in 
developing law and interpretation of the law, and the cases selected for adjudication (Schei 
2008; Skoghøy 2008).  
Proceedings of the Supreme Court in cases heard in division, Grand Chamber and plenary 
session are always oral, and are generally conducted in open court. Unlike in the District 
Courts and the Courts of Appeal evidence and testimonies are not presented directly before 
the Supreme Court. Nor does the Supreme Court conduct inspections outside the court (The 
Supreme Court of Norway 2007). The judges take turns writing the majority vote, but the 
chair can decide to abandon this procedure if the judge whose turn it is does not 
wholeheartedly support the vote.
40
 Dissenting votes are written by the dissenter or dissenters 
as a case can have more than one dissenting vote (Sunde 2011a, 8). Opinions and reasoning of 
the Court are published on the Supreme Court website in addition to being printed in Norsk 
Retstidende and published in the Lovdata Foundation legal information system. Dissenting 
opinions are also published.  
4.3 Legal culture and sources of law 
Unlike many other European countries judicial power is not divided amongst specialized 
courts in the final instance of the Norwegian legal system.
41
 Consequently, all civil and 
criminal disputes will appear before the Supreme Court if they are granted appeal after a 
decision in one of the Courts of Appeal. Pronouncing judgment in the final instance, the 
Supreme Court holds significant power when it comes to the development of the current legal 
doctrine (Schei 2004, 131). When the Supreme Court considers legal questions where there is 
no set precedent, the Court creates new law in that the approach taken by the Supreme Court 
in solving legal issues sets the standard for the other courts in the Norwegian legal system 
(Eckhoff and Helgesen 1997, 189).  
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 In principle it is the presiding judge who determines who writes the majority vote, but the practice is that the 
responsibility rotates based on the time spent since a judge last wrote the majority vote. An interesting detail is 
that the presiding judge never writes the majority vote (Schei 2010, 15). 
41
 Article 88 of the Norwegian Constitution prevents the division of judicial power amongst specialized courts in 




4.3.1 Legal culture 
Legal culture provides a framework for analyzing law through institutional and intellectual 
structures. Sunde (2010, 11) defines legal culture as “ideas and expectations of law made 
operational by institutional (-like) practices”. The institutional structure of legal culture is 
made up of institutions that shape law through their practices. Law consists of two major 
kinds of institutions: conflict resolution and norm producing institutions. The court system 
forms the basis for conflict resolution institutions in developed states, while norm producing 
institutions include both the courts and the lawmakers. Since it is impossible to foresee and 
prescribe solutions to all possible conflicts, the courts never cease to produce norms: “courts 
have to supply the legal system with legal norms to clarify or alter norms made through 
lawmaking, and to fill the lacunae of laws” (Sunde 2010, 21-22).  
In addition to an institutional structure, legal culture also consists of an intellectual structure. 
The intellectual structure is formed around a question of what law ought to be, and the ideas 
shaping law (Sunde 2010, 24-26). “Legal culture is partly shaped by the surrounding society; 
partly it is shaped by trends in scholarship, ideologies among lawyers and other groups of 
individuals (Nylund 2010, 167).” Nylund (2010, 167) notes that legal culture provides the 
framework for “doing law, thinking about law and talking about law”. These structures may 
change and develop over time. Hence, the interplay of institutional and intellectual structures, 
according to Sunde (2010, 29), is more suitable to study the legal historical and present 
aspects of law than legal systems or legal traditions.  
The development of a Nordic legal culture is related to the close cultural, historical and 
linguistic links between the Nordic countries.
42
 “Similar laws enable co-operation and sharing 
ideas and influences, and similar ideas, ideals and methods result in similar laws (Nylund 
2010, 179).” An important development for the Nordic legal culture was the introduction of 
legal realism, which is a theory of what law is and what the role of lawyers and legal scholars 
are.
43
 Scandinavian realism was influenced by the American realist movement of the 1920s, 
and provided a modern theory to supply the Nordic identity with a pragmatic and equal legal 
culture (Nylund 2010, 174-175). After the Second World War legal realism became the 
dominant view of courts in Scandinavia (Graver 2000, 431). In Norway, it was Torstein 
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 For an overview of the historical development of the Nordic legal culture see Nylund (2010). 
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Eckhoff and his contemporaries who paved the way for this theoretical position.
44
 The 
influence of realism on the Nordic legal culture is seen through the application of legal 
sources and legal reasoning in judicial decisions. Scandinavian legal realism, although it 
appears in slightly different versions in the different countries, still has a considerable impact 
on the way Nordic lawyers think about law, legal sources and legal reasoning (Nylund 2010, 
175).  
4.3.2 Sources of law 
Sources of law theory state the factors that should be considered when making decisions on 
the content of current law, and the relative importance of the individual factors. Sources of 
law are factors that can solve or contribute to the solving of legal questions (Nygaard 1999, 
35). In Norway, source of law principles are not statutory. Consequently, legal principles are 
determined by the practice of the Supreme Court (Andenæs 2009, 3-6). The use of legal 
sources in the courts, in addition to providing a standard for other appliers of law, is reflected 
in the account of legal sources in legal textbooks (Skoghøy 2011b, 12). Supreme Court 
practice may have an impact on two levels: first, decisions may serve as the basis for 
formation of rules over time. Second, the Supreme Court practice may impact the formation 
of legal principles applied when courts determine the outcome of legal questions (Nygaard 
1999, 57). Legal rules can be deducted from several legal principles, deciding which factors 
are relevant for the current case. Andenæs (2009, 6) points out that source of law principles 
are not usually explicitly mentioned in Supreme Court decisions, but from these decisions one 
can identify the underlying principles.  
Legal realism, through its normative foundations, focus on norm creation through judicial 
precedent (Sunde 2012, 170). The approach differentiates between factors that have to be 
considered and factors that can be considered when solving legal questions. It is the position 
in legal theory taught to Norwegian law students, and has been the dominant view in 
Norwegian jurisprudence for the past decades (Askeland 2003, 11, 13). The position was 
spearheaded by the legal scholar Torstein Eckhoff. In the book Rettskildelære (1971) he 
described the application of law the way it occurred in the court system, and presented a 
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 In addition to Eckhoff, Johs. Andenæs and Carsten Smith played central roles in development of the 




model for evaluating decisions based on a number of legal factors.
45
 Graver (2003, 2) notes 
that “[i]n the Norwegian legal culture, legal doctrine is expected to refer to the sources of law 
as they appear to the judge”. According to Eckhoff and Helgesen (1997, 22), one face two 
questions when accounting for what determines a legal question: The first is concerned with 
what is relevant. In other words, what one is allowed to consider based on the source of law 
principles. Second, the relevant factors should be categorized. This is a question of having a 
systematic approach.  
Central to Eckhoff’s (1971) description of the judicial process was the division of legal 
sources into seven categories and the institutionalization of equitable considerations.
46
 These 
source factors include the text of statutes, preparatory works, judicial practice (of the courts), 
administrative practice, custom, conceptions of justice (especially in legal literature), and 
equitable considerations.
47
 The seven sources of law identified by Eckhoff can be grouped 
according to three major types of decision rules according to Bernt et al. (1999, 209): Legal 
arguments relating to legislative intent, including law and preparatory works forms the first 
category. The second category contains legal arguments related to practice and custom, while 
equitable considerations form the basis for the third category. These general categories can 
also incorporate other legal sources than those identified by Eckhoff (Kjønstad 2006, 362).
48
  
Bernt et al.’s (1999) approach has been applied by Grendstad et al. (2010) to describe the 
decision rules of the Norwegian Supreme Court to build a framework for analysis of state 
friendly voting.
49
 While this approach simplifies the interpretation of the Court’s decision 
rules, it has been criticized, along with Eckhoff’s approach, for placing too much emphasis on 
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 Eckhoff’s methodological approach has been adopted, to some extent, by nearly every new Norwegian legal 
textbook published after Rettskildelære (Askeland 2003, 13). According to Graver (2000, 432), the paradigm 
shift in sources of law theory following Eckhoff’s introduction of legal realism was not due to his separation of 
legal sources into different factors (which had been proposed earlier by other legal scholars), but rather the 
dematerialization, or formalization, of legal concepts and the emphasis on the personal considerations of appliers 
of law. 
46
 The concept of equitable consideration was not originally introduced by Eckhoff, but he discussed the term to 
a greater extent than legal scholars had done previously (Kjønstad 2006, 361). 
47
 Eckhoff also considers international law as an eight category, which has since been incorporated as one of the 
formal legal sources. The translations of Eckhoff’s categories are based on the entries in the legal dictionary 
Jussleksikon on Ordnett.no. 
48
 Eckhoff’s seven categories and Bernt and Doublet’s trifold categorization are just two ways of approaching 
sources of law theory. Historically, only two categories were considered, while more recent works have 
identified upwards of twelve sources (Kjønstad 2006, 360-362). 
49
 Grendstad et al. do in fact refer to Doublet and Bernt (1992) when listing major types of decision rules. Here 
the categorization employed by Bernt et al. (1999) in Juss, samfunn og rettsanvendelse is used as an example, 
but it does not differ from the approach in Retten og vitenskapen (Doublet and Bernt 1992). For the use of the 




equitable considerations (e.g., Graver 2000; Magnussen 2005). This notion is, however, 
disputed by Skoghøy (2011b, 13) who points out that the emphasis on equitable 




The courts use and application of sources of law have become more extensive and open over 
the past 50 years (Skoghøy 2011b, 13). Equitable considerations have received greater 
emphasis, and the votes are of a more principal nature.
51
 The Supreme Court has developed a 
tendency to not only decide the case in question, but also give the Court’s opinion on 
principal questions brought up in the discussion of the case. Another development in the 
application of sources of law is the less strict adherence to precedent by the Supreme Court. 
The Court is also more inclined to cite legal theory in its decisions (Skoghøy 1996). Through 
the process of internationalization Supreme Court decisions in areas of law regulated by 
international treaties ratified by the Parliament will establish new limits, thus confining the 
scope of action available to legislators. Due to this function the Supreme Court will obtain a 
stronger presence of a constitutional court (Schei 2004, 133).   
Equitable considerations differ from the other sources of law in that they are not stipulated by 
formal rules. Judges are appointed on account of their qualifications as members of the legal 
profession, and equitable considerations are not judicial questions in a strict sense. When 
considering what is a fair or reasonable outcome judges operate outside the formal judicial 
framework. If equitable considerations become a major factor in legal determinations by the 
courts, it may give rise to issues of legitimacy (Magnussen 2005, 71). Equitable 
considerations provide appliers of law with what almost constitutes a carte blanche when 
deciding the contents of legal rules (Askeland 2003, 20). The result is that precedent based on 
considerations of what is fair and reasonable tend to be less binding on the Court than 
precedents based on more stable sources of law, making it harder to predict the outcome of 
Supreme Court decisions (Magnussen 2005, 72).
52
 Legal realism indicates that the application 
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 The dominant legal textbook in Norwegian law schools, Rettsgrunnlag og standpunkt (Nygaard 1999), follows 
the main arguments advocated by Eckhoff (Skoghøy 2011b, 12); although, from a civil law perspective rather 
than Eckhoff’s public law perspective.  
51
 For an overview of what constitutes equitable considerations see Kjønstad (2006) and Magnussen (2005), in 
addition to supra note 9. 
52
 Some argue that the Norwegian source of law theory is in a period of change (e.g., Askeland 2003; Graver 
2000; Kjønstad 2006). Kjønstad (2006, 378) provides three reasons for placing less emphasis on equitable 
considerations: (1) the Norwegian society is less homogeneous than it used to be, and different cultural and 




of law is a subjective endeavor, and that the scope of action available for subjective 
considerations increases with legal and social developments (Graver 2000, 465). 
4.4 Judicial politics – political functions of the Norwegian Supreme Court 
In the study of judicial behavior there has not been a tradition of separating judicial politics 
from legislative politics (Sunde 2012, 180). Sunde (2012, 182) argues that the Supreme Court 
is engaged in politics to fulfill its primary function as a dispute resolver through decisions 
vested in legal sources. This does not mean that the Court has the freedom of other political 
actors. Judicial politics is “a court’s ability and desire to affect the distribution of benefits and 
duties in different societal contexts in light of arguments claimed to be legally valid” (Sunde 
2012, 180, author's translation). Michalsen (2006, 92, author's translation) assert that “the 
courts do not have the political freedom of other actors, but is bound by what constitutes legal 
sources, the current principles of interpretation and the nature of the individual case”. Legal 
scholars would argue that judicial politics differ from legislative politics in that legislative 
politics provides the framework for judicial politics (e.g., Bernt et al. 1999, 30; Schei 2011, 
320; Smith 2012, 156). The discussions in the following sub-sections are not an attempt to 
decide whether the Supreme Court is a political institution, which it is, but to what degree 




4.4.1 Political functions 
Central to the discussion of the political function of the Supreme Court is the question of what 
constitutes politics and policy-making. David Easton’s (1953, cited in Shepsle and Bonchek 
1997, 13) definition of politics as “the authoritative allocation of values for a society” is a 
useful point of departure. This definition does not reduce politics to party politics, or limit the 
concept of politics to strategic behavior to alter social conditions. Closely related to the 
concept of politics is policy-making, which can be viewed as “the capacity of an institution to 
make authoritative decisions regarding the distribution of rights and resources” (Grendstad, 
Shaffer, and Waltenburg 2011c, 3). Keeping in mind the definition of politics presented by 
Easton, the concept of policy-making can be expanded to include values. The inclusion of 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
establish the consequences of a particular outcome, such as the goodness of the outcome; and (3) the amount of 
legal literature has increased significantly over the past decades, making it harder to discuss equitable 
considerations and preparatory works. 
53
 The Supreme Court is, in short, a political institution due to its political function of interpreting laws and the 




values ensures that the definition encompass Supreme Court decisions where there is not so 
much a question of distribution of rights and resources, but rather an allocation of values.  
Grendstad, Shaffer, and Waltenburg (2012c, 531) believe that Sunde’s approach, where law 
and politics are two opposing positions, is not particularly functional in studies of judicial 
behavior. They claim that the judicial branch of government ought to be studied based on 
attitudinal models developed in the social sciences, seeing that there is no reason why 
Norwegian legal practitioners and judges would be immune to influence from their personal 
preferences. Grendstad et al.’s (2012c, 530, author's translation) premise is that “conflict is a 
prerequisite for the legislative politics adopted by the Storting between contending interests, 
and conflict is a prerequisite for judicial politics and the development of law established in the 
Supreme Court through argumentation and considerations leading up to a solution to a dispute 
between two parties”. Although it is uncontroversial to assert that the institutional frameworks 
are different for legislative and judicial politics, the advantage of separating the two concepts 
can appear futile.  
A description of the Supreme Court in terms of a political body is provided by Grendstad et 
al. (2010, 81), who contend “[t]hat a political institution which adjudicates disputes over 
constitutional and statutory issues is a political body is self-evident, since the decisions of a 
nation’s highest court can and do have political implications (Grendstad et al. 2010, 81). The 
prevailing view is that the Supreme Court cannot exist outside of politics and political culture 
(Rosen, 2006, cited in Grendstad et al. 2010, 81; Schei 2011; Smith 2012); the role of the 
Supreme Court is not only to solve individual disputes, but also to develop the current legal 
doctrine. In the development of precedent and interpretation of legal sources the Supreme 
Court is exhibiting what can be considered to be a political function.  
Schei (2011, 319; 2012, 25-26) provides an overview of the foundation for attributing a 
political function to the Supreme Court. In his view, four points can briefly summarize the 
basis for this assumption: (1) there are similarities between the foundations for Supreme Court 
decisions and the foundations for decisions by political organs; (2) the effects of 
parliamentary legislation and the decisions of courts are similar; (3) legislation have to fulfill 
political purposes and have political effects, and when the Courts apply the law they realize, 




state actors and hold them to the law and the constitution through the function of horizontal 
accountability, enabling them to intervene in political decisions.  
4.4.2 Judicial politics and legitimacy 
Bernt et al. (1999, 219) point out that relative to the role of the judges and the appointment 
process, the consideration of political legitimacy causes multiple problems. Judges are 
appointed based on their professional background and their ability to interpret legal rules. 
They are not selected based on a political program, and do not have a mandate to decide what 
legal rules are in force. If the decisions of the Court, as Lund (1987, 213) states it, are more 
often than not dependent upon the justices’ values, including political assessments that can 
sometimes coincide with party politics, they are essentially political decisions. This is also 
implied by Smith (2000, 11, author's translation), who explains that “[t]he attitude of the 
Supreme Court should not primarily be towards following precedent, but rather to consider 
and, if possible, create precedent”. Defining the activity of courts as legislative politics does 
not change the fact that courts partake in political activities similar to that of other political 
actors. This can be viewed as nothing more than a “terminological trick” to separate the 
actions of judges from the actions of politicians (Sunde 2012, 183). 
When the Supreme Court creates law it does it through decisions in individual cases, while 
legislators are free to decide the time and the area of law when they create new laws. 
Consequently, the leeway available to the courts to make politically based decisions is 
different from that of the politicians. The scope of action is narrower, and legal decisions have 
to be, or at least appear to be, vested in legal sources (Schei 2011, 325-326, 334). However, 
through the interpretation of what the current application of the law should be the courts, and 
in the final instance the Supreme Court, decides the contents of laws. This positions the courts 
within the legislative process (Smith 2012, 156).  
Following the division between judicial politics and party politics outlined above may serve a 
useful purpose when analyzing the decisions of courts within a multilevel framework. 
Acknowledging the difference in institutional arrangements in the courts and the legislature 
and incorporating them in analytical frameworks may answer the critique from Norwegian 




studies of judicial behavior by social scientists.
54
 A hierarchical model can incorporate the 
intellectual and institutional structures identified by Sunde (2012), while at the same time 
testing the attitudinal approach advocated by Grendstad et al.  
4.4.3 Political dimensions 
The low dissent rate in the Norwegian Supreme Court has been taken to indicate that the 
Court is preoccupied with judicial politics, making decisions based on the formal sources of 
law. Judges do not view themselves as ordinary political actors, and have a distant 
relationship, at least consciously, to legislative politics (Sunde 2012, 185-186). Grendstad et 
al. (2010, 74) notes that “[a]mong judicial scholars, the Norwegian Supreme Court […] is 
assumed to decide cases primarily on the legal merits, rather than on political or philosophical 
grounds”.
55
 If judges decide cases primarily on the legal merits, “courts are not legislatures, 
and judges are not legislators” (Lax 2011, 152).
56
 The predominant view among judicial 
scholars may well be that the Court decides cases primarily on the legal merits, but they are 
also conscious of other influences. Smith (1975, 300, author's translation) wrote that “[i]t is 
also every reason to believe that judicial decisions are influenced largely by the same kinds of 
arguments and social factors that influence legislators and officials in the administration”. In 
other words, judgments are not apolitical; rather they are influenced by the attributes, attitudes 
and interactions of the judges. “Judicial legislation will, as other legislation, be a form of 
political activity (Smith 1975, 298, author's translation).” Schei (2011, 334) agrees with Smith 
in that the influence of ideology and attitudes in judicial decisions displays a political 
dimension. At the same time there is a difference between the freedoms legislators have in 
their assessments (de lege ferenda) compared to the limited freedom available to judges in 
their assessments (de serentia ferenda) (Smith 1975, 98). Courts, unlike the other state powers 
who are free to enact their political preferences within the framework of the Constitution, are 
bound by a methodological system that sets constraints on how results can be justified (Smith 
1990, 427; Smith 2012, 155-156). 
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 This is achieved by controlling for different legal and institutional variables assumed to constrain the policy 
space in which judges are free to act on their preferences.  
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 The claim is somewhat exaggerated. Most legal practitioners and judges acknowledge the influence of 
equitable considerations in decisions, which are based on considerations not grounded in the formal legal 
sources. Some, however, consider the reliance on equitable considerations to be too extensive. See supra note 52. 
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 The role of the Supreme Court in relation to the other branches of government has been debated since the 
adoption of the Norwegian constitution in 1814. One of the most prominent debates, considering whether or not 
the Supreme Court was a political organ (which is no longer subject to any serious debate), took place between 




However, “it is not reasonable to claim that creating legal rules in the Storting is a political 
activity, while creating legal rules in the Supreme Court is an apolitical activity” (Smith 1975, 
98, author's translation). Cases appearing before the Supreme Court generally have more than 
one possible outcome, and Supreme Court justices can reach both consensus and dissensus 
with equally coherent judicial arguments (Grendstad et al. 2012c, 531). Smith (1975, 298, 
author's translation) suggests that “any collegial court is […] a form of legislative assembly in 
miniature – whether the court likes it or not and whether or not it accepts it”.  The institutional 
frameworks of courts and legislatures may be different, but not to the extent that social 
science models cannot be applied to analyze court decisions. Schei (2012, 20, author's 
translation) provides an interesting perspective when observing that “the independence of 
judges is not only a question of independence from authority structures outside the realm of 
the courts, but also a question of the independency of individual judges relative to the other 
judges in a court – including the presiding judge”. The interactions among judges in a court 
appear to be interrelated with their preferences and the influence of legal factors. 
Consequently, analyzing judicial behavior along only one of these dimensions would fail to 
grasp the complexity of court decisions.   
The core issues regarding the interrelations between law and politics can be summed up by 
one quantitative and one qualitative question. Quantitatively, one can estimate the extent to 
which a political element is inherent in the application of law. The qualitative question is 
concerned with what political considerations are acceptable, and which have to be dismissed 
in the application of law. The extent of the political element can be estimated by examining 
the use and application of equitable considerations in judicial decisions. It is only through an 
extensive analysis of judicial decisions the leeway available to the courts can be described 
(Smith 1990, 427). The first question is empirical, while the second question is of a normative 
character. Here the aim is to describe the leeway available to the courts, not to determine what 
political considerations are acceptable.  
4.5 A ‘state friendly’ court 
Discussions of whether the Supreme Court is a political organ through its participation in the 
political process, as indicated in the previous sections, are for the most part rendered 
irrelevant. What is interesting is if this participation may compromise the general principles of 




Supreme Court, constitute one of three state powers. Rule of law assumes that courts are 
independent of the political authorities, yet, at the same time the courts have to be loyal to the 
law and the legislative will through the prevalent conception of law (Graver 2012).
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 Chief 
Justice Smith (1996, 193, author's translation) asserted that “[w]e have to be attentive to any 
statements that have the characteristics of a legal source. But we cannot have a relationship 
with the other branches of government so close that our attentiveness exceeds this limit.” The 
extent to which courts exercise their role as an organ for the state is difficult to disclose due to 
the nature of judicial decisions. Persuasive arguments vested in legal sources constitute the 
foundation for these decisions, but the reality is that there are hardly any limitations to the 
variety of results that can be justified with legal reasoning (Lund 1987, 216).  
An interesting attribute of the Norwegian Supreme Court is that it is ‘state friendly’, in so far 
as statistically, the state wins more cases than it loses. While the percentage of pro-state 
decisions definitely is significantly higher than for private party litigants, it can be considered 
natural that the state wins more cases than private litigants (Skoghøy 2011a, 719; Tellesbø 
2006, 65). The state represents the public interest, and it would be an issue of concern if it 
were to lose more cases than it won. Theoretically, however, one would expect the 
distribution of results pursuant of either the state or private litigants, at least in the Supreme 
Court according to Skoghøy (2011a, 719), to be evenly proportioned. Approximately 20 
percent of the total number of cases heard by the Appeals Committee is granted leave to 
appeal. The strict filtering process should in theory reduce the imbalance between the results 
pursuant of the state and those of the private parties.  
Government Advocate Sven Ole Fagernæs (2007) provides an explanation for why one 
should not expect the outcomes to be proportional. In the majority of the cases appearing 
before the Supreme Court, the state is the appellee, meaning that it won in the previous 
instance. The probability of a result pursuant of the state in the Supreme Court is thus higher 
than for the appellant. Another reason is the appeals process itself. The state is restrictive 
when it comes to appealing to the Supreme Court, not viewing it as a court in the third 
instance in place for correcting incorrect decisions of the lower courts but rather a place for 
deciding principal legal questions. Thus, the screening function of the Supreme Court 
suggests that the distribution of results should not be evenly proportioned. A result pursuant 
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to the government interest does not in and of itself define the Court or justices as ‘state 
friendly’ (Skåre 1997, 501). However, if there are other factors involved in making favorable 
decisions for the state, the relationship with the Court should be considered closely. An 
example would be the preference of public over private interests in court decisions due to the 
composition of the Supreme Court (Smith 1997, 4).  
If there are situations where a justice’ decision is placing greater emphasis on the state’s 
interests and or gives less considerations to the interest of the opposing party in court 
proceedings than what is established by the current legal doctrine, the Court is exhibiting a 
state friendly nature (Kjønstad 1999, 103; Tellesbø 2006, 67). Central to the claim of ‘state 
friendliness’ is the question of whether a case is decided in favor of the state, or public 
interest, at the expense of private parties without sufficient justification based on the available 
legal sources and equitable considerations (Skoghøy 2011a, 712; Smith 1997, 4). The concept 
of ‘state friendliness’ calls into question the assertion that the current legal doctrine equals the 
results the Supreme Court arrives at in its decisions (Tellesbø 2006, 65). If there is not 
sufficient justification for a result pursuant of the state, at least from a political science 
perspective, the decision must rest on other factors than what the current legal doctrine 
prescribes. 
4.5.1 The state friendly hypothesis 
The state friendly hypothesis, according to Grendstad et al. (2011b, 4), builds on two distinct 
but related claims.
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 First, the Norwegian Supreme Court is state friendly because it decides 
cases in favor of the state at a much higher rate than those of private party litigants (Grendstad 
et al. 2011b; Kjønstad 1999). This claim is supported empirically by the fact that the state 
over time wins approximately 60 to 80 percent of the cases where it was a party, depending 
on the area of law involved (Kjønstad 1999, 97; Ryssdal 2007, 1).
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 Presumably, one of the 
reasons for the higher rate is due to the government having greater resources and a 
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 Grendstad et al. use the term ‘government friendly’. See supra note 1.  
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 A high percentage of victories do not necessarily indicate that the Court has a ‘state friendly’ inclination. The 
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the Court, the appearance of the state as both petitioner and respondent, and the fact that the state represents, and 
has to represent, a number of interests across a variety of issues (Grendstad et al. 2011b, 4; Kjønstad 1999, 104). 
If the victory rate for the state is particularly high in an area of law it may lead to private parties not appealing 





significantly higher limit on expenditures than its opponents (Fagernæs 2007, 54; Tellesbø 
2006, 77).  
Predisposition to vote in favor of the state over time is the second claim identified by 
Grendstad et al. (2011b, 4). The assumption is specifically linked to discussions of the impact 
of justices’ background on their decisional behavior in Court. Justices bring with them a set of 
values to the Court primarily rooted in their background, which leads to favoring the state 
when casting their votes. Østlid (1988, 41) believes that there is no doubt that there is a 
connection between judges’ political perceptions and their behavior as judges. It is a 
possibility that in cases appearing before the courts with political relevance they may 
pronounce judgments affected by political perceptions.  
The following hypotheses can be established based on background characteristics of the 
justices expected to impact decisions identified in the judicial decisions’ literature: 
h1.1:  The decision to vote in favor of the state in civil cases where the state is a party  
is affected by the nature of the previous legal career of the justices. 
h1.2:  Former employment with the Legislation Department increases the likelihood 
of voting in favor of the state 
h1.3:  Former employment with the Government Advocate increases the likelihood of 
voting in favor of the state. 
h1.4:  Former employment with the Director General of Public Prosecutions increases 
the likelihood of voting in favor of the state.    
h1.5:  The nature of the appointing government impacts the propensity for voting for  
or against the state. 
h1.6:  Oslo-born justices are more state friendly than other judges.  
Through analysis of the votes of individual justices and the outcome of court decisions one 
can “ascertain which legal forces affect a justice’s decisional behavior with respect to voting 
in favor of the [state] party or not” (Grendstad et al. 2011b, 4, emphasis in original).
60
 The 
flexibility of judicial methodology enables justices to pursue their preferences while still 
adhering to the law. Only the hardest cases, “where the different sources of law do not point 
                                                          
60
 Grendstad et al. (2011b) employ the term ‘legal forces’ to account for factors that influence judicial decisions, 
which are not legal sources. In an earlier paper published in Retfærd, and another paper published in Tidsskrift 
for Rettsvitenskap in 2011, they apply the term ‘extra-legal forces’ to represent the same general concept as 
‘legal forces’. In this paper the concepts of ‘extra-legal forces’ will be used to describe the effect of different 





to one single and/or indisputable solution”, are dealt with by the Court (Sunde 2011a, 11). 
When the authoritative legal sources do not provide a clear-cut answer to the dispute in 
question, more than one solution can be legally justifiable (Skoghøy 2011a, 713).
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Consequently, preference initiated behavior can become part of the reasoning behind a 
decision. 
Two additional claims can be included in the state friendly hypothesis identified by Grendstad 
et al. Kjønstad (1999, 97, author's translation) asserts that “the explanations of the possible 
state friendly [nature of the] Supreme Court is not to be found in individual characteristics [of 
the justices], but in structural characteristics [of the Court]”. He points out that it is not the 
background of individual judges and how they vote in certain cases that are central, but the 
legal environment that may form in the Supreme Court if recruitment is predominantly from 
the state administration. The nature of the recruitment process will shape the collegial 
character of the Court over time, and thus have the potential to affect the outcome of cases if 
the composition becomes unbalanced. Schei (2004, 138) support this claim when he states 
that the composition of the court can be reflected in the outcome of a case, especially in non-
unanimous decisions. It is also considered by Skoghøy (2011b, 15), who is of the opinion that 
the increase in judicial review is related to the broadening recruitment to the Court. However, 
contrary to Schei and Skoghøy, Smith (1997, 4) moderates the assumption of state friendly 
characteristics due to overrepresentation of former public employees and maintains a focus on 
the effect of individual preferences of judges.  
From these assessments the following hypotheses can be established for the second level in 
the hierarchical model of judicial decisions: 
h2.1:  Panels where justices with background from the Legislation Department are in 
majority are more likely to vote in favor of the state. 
h2.2:  Homogenous panels where all justices were appointed by a Social-Democratic 
government are more likely to vote in favor of the state. 
These hypotheses deal with the collegial nature of the Supreme Court. Analyses of the 
collegial impacts on voting have not been the major focus of studies of judicial decisions in 
the Norwegian Supreme Court to date, so rather than strict hypothesis testing the analysis at 
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this level takes the form of exploration. Several authors have suggested that rather than being 
dependent upon the votes of the panel majority an individual justice may constrain the votes 
of the majority by threatening to dissent (e.g., Kastellec 2007; 2011a) 
Importance of the case is another claim that can be added to the state friendly hypothesis. The 
justices’ attitudes are expected to operate particularly strongly in salient cases (e.g., Collins 
2008; Unah and Hancock 2006). Different areas of law may not be the direct cause of state 
friendly voting, but they can indicate whether some areas make the Court more prone to favor 
the state over individuals in its decisions. As pointed out earlier, Lund (1987, 215) has noted 
that when substantial state interests are involved one can generally disregard that the courts 
will rule in disfavor of the state. Social security law and tax law, which both fall within the 
general category economic cases, are two relevant examples of areas of law that are important 
for the state. This is mainly due to the significant impact the outcome in these cases can have 
on the state’s revenue. Another interesting area of law is concerned with international 
agreements. The Supreme Court has a tendency to vote in favor of the state in cases 
concerning EU law and EEA law (Fredriksen 2011, 97). What constitutes substantial interests 
is not easy to determine, and neither is the relative importance of a case without reverting to 
subjective considerations. However, cases where the Government Advocate is representing 
the state can be considered of a higher importance than when the state is represented by 
another party. It is apparent that some areas of law are more important for the state than 
others. 
To test these claims four additional hypotheses are established for the second level of the 
analysis: 
h2.3: When substantial state interests are at stake the justices are susceptible to favor 
the state over private parties in civil cases where the state is a party. 
h2.4: In cases where the Government Advocate represents the state the justices are 
more likely to vote in favor of the state. 
h2.5:  In cases regarding EU law and EEA law the justices are more likely to favor 
the state over private parties. 
h2.6:  In economic cases the justices are more likely to favor the state over private 
parties. 





4.5.2 Explaining the state friendly nature of the Court – a hierarchical model and hypotheses 
Preference of public over private interests is, as already mentioned, central to the state 
friendly hypothesis. Lund (1987, 215) explained that even though the judicial branch of 
government is the enforcer of the state’s authority, the Norwegian courts are primarily team 
players guarding the state’s interests, the control function being secondary. Recalling the 
model established at the end of the previous chapter, the analysis of the state friendly 
hypothesis will be based on a two-level hierarchical model. Due to the exploratory nature of 
the analysis the hypotheses outlined above are of a somewhat general nature. Other factors 
than the ones listed in the hypotheses may influence the propensity to vote in favor of the 
state, but they take the form of exploration rather than strict hypothesis testing. The 
operationalization of the explanatory variables is outlined in the data chapter along with the 
control variables. Expectations regarding the impact of the control variables on the analysis 
are also discussed in chapter six.  
The different hypotheses belong to different levels of the analysis. Table 4.1 provides an 
overview of the hypotheses and their placement in the hierarchical model. In the next chapter 
a formal overview of the two-level model and the method used for estimations is provided. In 
chapter six the explanatory variables and the control variables are presented together with 
their expected outcome based on previous analyses of judicial decisions in the Norwegian 













Table 4.1. State friendly hypotheses 
       
Justice-level hypotheses 
    
h1.1:  
The decision to vote in favor of the state in civil cases where the state is a party is affected by 
the nature of the previous legal career of the justices. 
h1.2:  
Former employment with the Legislation Department increases the likelihood of voting in favor 
of the state 
h1.3:  
Former employment with the Government Advocate increases the likelihood of voting in favor 
of the state. 
h1.4:  
Former employment with the Director General of Public Prosecutions increases the likelihood 
of voting in favor of the state.    
h1.5:  
The nature of the appointing government impacts the propensity for voting for or against the 
state. 
h1.6:  Oslo-born justices are more state friendly than other judges.  
Panel-level hypotheses(panel) 
    
h2.1:  
Panels where justices with background from the Legislation Department are in majority are 
more likely to vote in favor of the state. 
h2.2:  
Homogenous panels where all justices were appointed by a Social-Democratic government are 
more likely to vote in favor of the state. 
Panel-level hypotheses (case) 
    
h2.3: 
When substantial state interests are at stake the justices are susceptible to favor the state over 
private parties in civil cases where the state is a party. 
h2.4: 
In cases where the Government Advocate represents the state the justices are  more likely to 
vote in favor of the state. 
h2.5:  
In cases regarding EU law and EEA law the justices are more likely to favor the state over 
private parties. 
h2.6:  In economic cases the justices are more likely to favor the state over private parties. 







Chapter 5 - Method 
The existence of data grouped at different levels in hierarchies is neither accidental nor 
ignorable (Goldstein 2011, 1) In this chapter the method for analysis of the state friendly 
hypotheses derived in chapter four is outlined and discussed.
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 The chapter opens with an 
overview of the benefits of multilevel modeling and hierarchical structured analyses. Then the 
issues arising from ignoring hierarchical structures are reviewed, before three different 
approaches for the assessment of whether a multilevel analysis is required for an analysis are 
considered. In section 5.2 a multilevel framework for analysis of the state friendly hypotheses 
outlined in the previous chapter is established, and a two-level hierarchical generalized linear 
model is presented. Finally, the validity of the research method is considered in light of the 
available data and theoretical framework.  
5.1 Multilevel analysis 
Many kinds of data have a hierarchical, clustered, or nested structure, and social research 
regularly involves problems that investigate the relationship between individuals and society. 
One can generally see “that individuals interact with the social context to which they belong, 
that individual persons are influenced by the social groups or contexts to which they belong, 
and that those groups are in turn influenced by the individuals who make up that group” (Hox 
2010, 1). Multilevel data are structures that consist of multiple units of analysis, one nested 
within the other (Steenbergen and Jones 2002, 218). Individuals and groups can be defined at 
separate levels in this hierarchical system. The term ‘multilevel analysis’ indicate the 
application of statistical models for data that have two or more distinct hierarchical levels 
(Hox and Roberts 2011, 4). Several advantages are offered by multilevel models that ordinary 
single-level analyses cannot capture. In addition to allow independent variables at any level of 
a hierarchical structure, random effects for clusters and subjects can be added for higher levels 
in the hierarchy (Guo and Zhao 2000, 443; Hedeker 2010, 26). 
The purpose of multilevel modeling, like ordinary regression analysis, is to model the 
relationship between a response variable and a set of explanatory variables. (Rabe-Hesketh 
and Skrondal 2012, 1). Agresti et al. (2000, 28) note that “in many applications […] the 
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dependency structure is more complex than the independent observations assumed by 
ordinary models for categorical or continuous variables”. Thus, ignoring the relationships 
between members of a group and omitting the importance of group effects may render 
traditional statistical analyses invalid (Fielding and Goldstein 2006, 8). Contrary to traditional 
regression analysis multilevel modeling account for observations at different levels in a 
hierarchy to resolve the shortcomings of single-level analyses. “Multilevel analysis enables 
the derivation of information about relationships among measurements operating at different 
levels simultaneously (Fielding and Goldstein 2006, 9).” The theoretical argument for using 
multilevel modeling techniques is that much of what social scientists study is hierarchical in 
nature. To account for these structures the analytic techniques should also be multilevel (Luke 
2004, 4). Snijders and Bosker (2012, 2) provides a useful description when they consider 
multilevel analysis as “a methodology for the analysis of data with complex patterns of 
variability, with a focus on nested sources of such variability”. At each level of nesting there 
is variability that has a distinct interpretation. The goal of multilevel analysis is to account for 
variance in a dependent variable that is measured at the lowest level of analysis by 
considering information from all levels of analysis (Steenbergen and Jones 2002, 219).
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Analyses of judicial decisions can benefit from the multilevel approach, seeing that the nature 
of the decisions conforms to the multilevel framework both on an empirical and a theoretical 
level. Judicial decisions can be viewed in terms of a hierarchically structured system where 
judges are nested within panels, interacting with, influencing, and being influenced by each 
other. There is a relationship between the variables characterizing the individuals and the 
variables characterizing the panels, or groups. Thus, the statement that “[f]ixed effects 
models, which assume that all observations are independent of each other, are not appropriate 
for analysis of […] clustered […] data” holds for studies of judicial decisions (Hedeker 2010, 
26). Multilevel analysis “encourages systematic analysis of how covariates measured at 
various levels of a hierarchical structure affect the outcome variable and how the interactions 
among covariates measured at different levels affect the outcome variable” (Guo and Zhao 
2000, 444). By utilizing single-level analysis of judicial decisions some of this variability 
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would not be captured. In addition, there are several issues that may arise if a hierarchical data 
structure is ignored.  
Hierarchical modeling and related methods have not been prominent in the study of judicial 
decisions. Although several scholars present arguments in favor of integrated models of 
judicial behavior (e.g., Brace and Hall 1993; 1997; Dyevre 2008; 2010), the extent to which 
these methodological approaches have been applied in research has been limited. In the 
American literature on judicial behavior multilevel analysis is sometimes used, but rarely to 
account for more than two theoretical positions at the time (e.g., Bartels 2009; 2011). Studies 
of Norwegian Supreme Court decisions are in a similar position, considering that the 
hierarchical structure of the data is generally ignored or accounted for in single-level models 
using robust standard errors. Two recent multilevel analyses by Berntsen (2012) and Skiple 
(2012) are the exceptions.  
5.1.1 The issue of hierarchy  
Ignoring the clustering of data can lead to incorrect standard errors, confidence intervals, and 
significance tests, and carries significant statistical costs (Goldstein 2011, 3). Traditional 
linear and binary regression models tend to underestimate the standard errors when the 
structure of the data is hierarchical and the assumption of independently and identical 
distributed observations is ignored (Guo and Zhao 2000, 444; Leeuw and Meijer 2008b, 1). 
Historically, multilevel structures have been analyzed by aggregating or disaggregating 
variables to a single level of interest followed by some form of standard (single-level) 
analysis (Hox 2010, 3). Failing to account for the multilevel nature of the data may lead to 
erroneous conclusions, because independence assumptions are likely to be violated (Snijders 
and Bosker 2012, 6). Thus, analysis of variables from different levels in a hierarchy at one 
single common level is inadequate, and leads to two distinct types of problems. The first is 
statistical and is concerned with aggregation and disaggregation of data. If data is aggregated 
from many sub-units to fewer values for higher-level units information is lost, and the 
statistical analysis loses power. Disaggregation of data leads to the opposite problem. By 
disaggregating data for a few higher-level units to many sub-level units, significance tests will 
reject the null-hypothesis far too often, leading to spurious results (Hox 2010, 3; Leeuw and 




The second problem is conceptual and is concerned with the fallacy of misinterpreting results 
by analyzing the data at one level and formulating conclusions at another level.
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 Ecological 
fallacy, which the interpretation of aggregated data at the individual level, is the most 
common fallacy and is often used as a definition of the conceptual problem (Hox 2010, 3; 
Leeuw and Meijer 2008b, 1). In essence, the conceptual problem deals with the fact that a 
correlation between macro-level variables cannot be used to make assertions about micro-
level relations (Snijders and Bosker 2012, 15). An interesting paper by Wilson (2006) reviews 
the effect ecological fallacy can have on studies of judicial behavior through a reanalysis of 
Segal and Spaeth’s (2002) attitudinal model. He finds that ecological fallacy leads to a 
significant reduction in the model’s explanatory power when it is accounted for in the 
analysis. There are also other potential fallacies that are discussed in the statistical literature. 
An example is the atomistic fallacy, which is the formulation of inferences at a higher level 
based on analyses performed at a lower level (Hox 2010, 3).  
5.1.2 Assessing the need for a multilevel model 
The need for a multilevel model in an analysis can be assessed empirically, statistically or 
theoretically. Empirically, the intraclass correlation coefficient can measure the proportion of 
variance in the dependent variable that is accounted for by groups. By assessing the intraclass 
correlation one can determine whether a multilevel model would be useful in analyzing the 
data in question. The statistical justification for a multilevel model is concerned with the 
nature of the observations. If the assumption of independent error terms is violated due to 
nested structures in the data, ordinary regression analysis will produce standard errors that are 
too small, potentially leading to an increased frequency of type I errors.
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 Multilevel models 
account for the clustering of the data, and will produce unbiased errors and parameter 
estimates. The theoretical justification for a multilevel model is based on the notion that 
researchers should use multilevel statistical models when the theoretical framework or 
hypotheses are composed of constructs operating and interacting at multiple levels (Luke 
2004, 17-23).  
Multilevel models enable the combination of multiple levels of analysis in a single 
comprehensible model by specifying predictors at different levels (Steenbergen and Jones 
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2002, 219). The propositions from Dyevre (2010) and Brace and Hall (1997) for integrated 
models of judicial behavior fits well within this framework. Theoretical explanations 
spanning several levels can be analyzed without the probable misspecification of models 
composed of only a single level. Analyzing integrated models of judicial decisions in a single-
level analysis would violate several of the basic assumption for a regression analysis 
mentioned above. In multilevel models one can assess the average correlation between 
variables within groups and between groups, and account for the biases in the standard errors 
(Hox 2010, 4-5).  
Another feature of multilevel models is the ability to explore causal heterogeneity. By 
specifying cross-level interactions it is possible to determine whether the causal effect of 
lower-level predictors is conditioned or moderated by higher-level predictors (Steenbergen 
and Jones 2002, 219). This is particularly interesting when considering the relationships and 
interactions inherent in judicial decisions. Keeping that in mind, a multilevel model 
potentially entails significant benefits compared to analysis carried out at only one level.
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5.2 Establishing a multilevel framework 
The three theoretical approaches identified in chapter three and four can be fitted to a two-
level hierarchical model, where judges are nested in panels. In this structure the dependent 
variable, the vote of the individual justices’, is a variable measured at the first level.
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 The 
logic behind the model is that the effects legal and structural variables have on individual 
votes can be considered. This would answer the critique from legal scholars regarding social 
scientists ignorance of legal influences on judicial decisions. In addition to consider the effect 
of case related variables, the analysis can also account for some of the other structural factors 
in judicial decision-making, such as the clustering of judges in panels.  
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 Identifying and accounting for cross-level interactions and random slopes is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
The state friendly hypothesis has not been tested in a multilevel model prior to this study on decisions of the 
Norwegian Supreme Court. Due to the exploratory nature of the analysis only random intercepts are applied to 
the model.  
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serve as the dependent variable. An analysis of case outcomes rather than the votes of the individual justices 




5.2.1 A hierarchical generalized linear model 
Considering the dichotomous dependent variable and multilevel nature of the judicial 
decisions’ data a hierarchical generalized linear model, more specifically a logistic regression 
model, will form the basis for the analysis.
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 There are two specific reasons for using logistic 
regression rather than linear regression. A meaningful model for dichotomous variables 
provides fitted values between one and zero, and thus has a restricted range of possible 
outcomes. Linear regression can take the fitted values outside the allowed range, which would 
not result in a meaningful model. The second reason is that there is often some natural relation 
between the mean and the variance of the distribution for discrete variables, which can lead to 
a relation between the parameters in the fixed part and the parameters of the random part of 
the model (Snijders and Bosker 2012, 289-290).   
Ordinary regression models are extended in two ways by generalized linear models: “(1) it 
allows for non-normal responses, and (2) it allows modeling a function of the mean rather 
than the mean itself (Agresti et al. 2000, 29).” The problem of non-normality distributed 
variables is approached by generalized linear models by including the necessary 
transformations and the choice of the appropriate error distribution explicitly in the statistical 
model (Hox 2010, 113). Error terms are assumed to follow a logistic distribution and the 
random effects a normal distribution (Hedeker 2008, 241). “The random effects represent 
unobserved heterogeneity and induce dependence between units nested in clusters (Skrondal 
and Rabe-Hesketh 2009, 659).” When models include random effects they are usually 
referred to as generalized linear mixed models, which can be viewed as an extension to the 
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 The dependent variable, whether a judge votes for or against the state, is coded dichotomously with the value 1 
indicating a vote pursuant of the state and the value 0 indicating a vote against the state. 
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Generalized linear models are defined by three components: (1) an outcome variable with a 
specific error distribution (in this case binominal); (2) a linear additive predictor; and (3) a 
link function (in this case the logit link). The options of choosing a non-normal error 
distribution and  using a nonlinear link function are extensions to the standard linear 
regression models (Hox 2010, 113-114). A two-level non-linear model can be written, using 
algebraic notation, in the general form 
yij = ij + rij 




The probability ij is estimated via a nonlinear link function for the linear predictor, defined 
by 
 ij = f (00 + 10xij + u0j),     
in which ij is the expected value for the ij-th level-one unit, or, stated differently, level-one 
unit i  in level-two unit j.  f is a nonlinear function of the linear predictor (00 + 10xij + u0j). To 
complete the model the distribution for the observed response  yij|ij has to be specified 
(Goldstein 2011, 111). The probability of a response equal to one can be defined as ij = Pr(yij 
= 1), which in this case is the Bernoulli distribution (Guo and Zhao 2000, 446).  
5.2.2 Developing a two-level model 




The generalized linear model for dichotomous data can be specified by a logistic regression 
model. The model has a binominal () distribution with mean , and the link function is the 
logit function given by  = logit(). Extending the generalized linear model to a multilevel 
structure, the probability distribution for ij, which is the probability of a response equal to 
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one for the observed response yij changes to (, nij). The mean and logit link function remains 
the same as in the single-level logistic model (Hox 2010, 113, 117).
71
 
When multilevel data is analyzed the standard procedure is to begin with a simple model, 
before expanding it in several interconnected steps to include multiple random effects. The 
simplest case of a hierarchical model is a random effects analysis of variance model, which is 
an unconstrained model also known as an empty model. Explanatory variables do not figure in 
this model, and consequently it only contains random groups and random variations within 
groups (Snijders and Bosker 2012, 49). Estimation of an unconditional, or empty, model is 
usually the first step in a multilevel analysis.  
For a two-level model the empty model is designated by the following formula  
yij = 00 + u0j    (empty model)  
where 00 designates the probability distributions for the group-dependent probabilities and u0j 
the random effects accounting for variation at level two.
72
 In other words, the only fixed-
effect (00) is the average value of the dependent variable across all subjects, and the error 
term can be viewed as the variability between panels (u0j) (Luke 2004, 20-21). From the 
empty model the respective variance of the residual error can be obtained (   
 ), and the 
intraclass correlation can be estimated to identify the proportion of variance explained at the 
panel level. Intraclass correlation indicates the proportion of the variance explained by the 
grouping structure in the population, and can help decide whether a multilevel model is 
required (Hox 2010, 33-34; Luke 2004, 18-19). That is not to say that the intraclass 
correlation measures the strength of a multilevel model over ordinary least squares, or similar, 
regressions. It would be incorrect to interpret the coefficient as a measure of the magnitude of 
difference between a multilevel model and a single-level model (Roberts et al. 2011, 220-221) 
For the panel level the intraclass correlation can be estimated by the formula 
  = 
   
 
   
     
 . 
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 nijk indicates the number of trials, and if there is only one trial the data is dichotomous (Hox 2010, 117).  
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 The model does not include a separate parameter for the level-one variance This is because the level-one 
residual variance of the dichotomous outcome variable follows directly from the success probability, i.e., var(eij) 




Following the estimation of the unconstrained model and the assessment of the intraclass 
correlation explanatory variables are added to the model.
73
 Variables at the individual level 
are added first, before variables at the panel level are included. Model fit and changes to the 
intraclass correlation are assessed at each step in the process. For the variables at the second 
level random effects can be specified in the form of random intercepts and random slopes.
74
 
While it is normal to include random intercepts in multilevel models, random slopes require 
strict theoretical justifications before being included. 
Expansions of the model are done in several interconnected steps, depending on the empirical 
and theoretical justifications for the analysis. In the case of one explanatory variable the 
following formulas (adapted from Snijders and Bosker 2012, 90) apply for the different levels 
when employing a multistage formulation: 
Yij = 0j + 1jxij    (level-one) 
0j = 00 + u0j     (level-two model for intercept) 
1j = 10 + u1j     (level-two model for slope) 
With substitution, the reduced form of the multistage formulation of a two-level model with 
random intercepts will be as follows: 
yij = 00 + 10xij + u0j    (two-level random intercept model). 
Including a logit link function provides the generalized linear formulation of the combined 
two-level random intercept model:  
 yij = logistic(ij) 
log[ij / (1-ij)] =  00 + 10xij + u0j, 
or alternatively as 
 ij = logistic(00 + 10xij + u0j)  (two-level random intercept with logit). 
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 If a latent variable approach is used, which is detailed in sub-section 5.2.3, the standard logistic distribution for 
the level-one residual implies a variance (  
 ) of 
2
/3, and the formulas for estimating the intraclass correlation 
outlined above can be used to estimate the proportion of the variance explained at each level (Snijders and 
Bosker 2012, 305). 
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 Random slopes are sometimes referred to as random coefficients. Here the analysis is limited to the inclusion 




5.2.3 A latent variable approach 
The hierarchical generalized linear model can be formulated as a threshold-model in which 
the dichotomous outcome variable y is conceived of as the result of an underlying non-
observed continuous variable y*. y is equal to one if the non-observed variable y* is larger 
than some threshold (Guo and Zhao 2000, 447; Snijders and Bosker 2012, 303). Goldstein 
(2011, 129) point out that when the outcome variable is truly discrete, such as mortality or 
voting, the threshold model would seem to have less justification. There is, however, not a 
significant bias caused by the application of a threshold model. 
A threshold-model can help ease the interpretation of generalized linear models. To represent 
a logistic regression model, the level-one residual of the latent variable must have a logistic 
distribution (Snijders and Bosker 2012, 304). The unobserved latent variable for a logistic 
distribution has a mean of zero and a variance of 
2
/3 (Hedeker 2008, 240). In logistic 
regression the underlying latent variable is rescaled when new explanatory variables are 
added to the model, so the lowest level residual variance (  
 ) will always equal 
2
/3. A level-
one residual is not included in the model because   
  is a scale factor set to 1.00 when a 
binominal distribution is applied. The variance of a logistic distribution with a scale factor 
1.00 is 
2
/3, yielding a constant lowest-level residual variance (Hox 2010, 128, 133-134). 
Thus the following formula represents the two-level random intercept model: 
ij = logistic(00 + 10xij + u0j [+ eij]).  
If the logistic model is presented as a threshold-model, the formula for estimating the 
intraclass correlation in sub-section 5.2.2 can be applied directly. The advantage of this 
approach is that the residual intraclass correlation can be estimated by simply extending the 
definition detailed in sub-section 5.2.2 (Snijders and Bosker 2012, 305). 
5.2.4 Cross-classification and multiple membership structures 
A possible extension to the two-level hierarchical generalized linear model is the inclusion of 
cross classification and multiple membership structures, which were briefly considered in 
section 5.2 in relation to alternative nesting structures. The assumption of the multilevel 
structure outlined above, following Snijders and Bosker (2012, 205), is “that each lower-level 
unit is perfectly nested in one, and only one higher-level unit”. This is a rather weak 




often too complex to be fitted in a strict nested structure (Browne, Goldstein, and Rabash 
2001, 103). Judicial behavior is one example, where the same lower-level units belong to 
several higher-level units.  
Hierarchies analyzed in the social sciences are often imperfect. Units may belong to more 
than one unique higher-level unit (multiple membership), or uniquely to a higher-level unit of 
one type while simultaneously belonging to a unique higher-level unit of a different type, 
which are not nested (cross-classified) (Snijders and Bosker 2012, 205). Chung and Beretvas 
(2011, 13) found that the consequence of using regular multilevel analysis on multiple 
membership structures can lead to substantially underestimated intraclass correlation 
coefficients, resulting in researchers selecting traditional regression models over multilevel 
models. Although it is beyond the scope of this thesis to include these types of structures in 
the analysis they should be considered for future studies of judicial decisions when imperfect 
hierarchical models form the framework for analysis.
75
 An example is in studies of non-
unanimous judicial decisions where the intraclass correlation is frequently close to zero. In the 
analysis in chapter seven the imperfect nested structure is taken into consideration in the 
interpretation of the results, but it is not explicitly modeled in the statistical analysis.  
5.3 Validity of the research method 
Given the hierarchical structure of the data, an analytical approach that takes the nested 
structure into consideration seems to be appropriate. Both theoretical and statistical 
justifications for a multilevel approach are present, and as indicated by the discussions in this 
chapter, not taking the hierarchical structure into account could lead to biased estimates. A 
single-level analysis of the data on judicial decisions within the theoretical framework 
presented in this thesis would by definition result in ecological fallacy. Thus the only viable 
option besides a multilevel statistical analysis is a qualitative analysis of judicial decisions. 
However, if the aim is to estimate the extent to which a political element is inherent in the 
application of law it is, as Smith (1990, 427) viewed it, only through an extensive analysis of 
judicial decisions the leeway available to the courts can be described. This will require a 
statistical analysis. 
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To conclude the overview of the methodological approach a brief discussion of the choice to 
model case predictors and panel predictors at the same level is required. Although panels and 
cases are not equivalent, they can be placed at the same level in the hierarchical model. Panels 
can be considered in terms of being a case attribute. Thus the model is not miss-specified if 
both the panel-specific predictors and the case-specific predictors are considered to be 




Chapter 6 - Data 
The operationalization of the predictors used in the analysis is presented in this chapter. 
Explanatory factors and controls are outlined in turn based on their placement in the 
hierarchical structure. The theoretical justification for the inclusion in the analysis is specified 
for each variable presented, in addition to their expected direction and how they are coded. In 
conclusion, a brief discussion of the validity and reliability of the data is provided.  
6.1 Judicial decisions 
Data on judicial decisions used in this thesis is predominantly provided by the Political 
Behavior on the Supreme Court of Norway database (DORANOH) established by Grendstad, 
Shaffer, and Waltenburg (2012a). The information on judicial decisions in this database is 
retrieved from decisions published in the Lovdata Foundation legal information system and 
decisions published in Norsk Retstidende. Data characterizing the individual justices in the 
database were acquired from publicly available information and personal inquiries to the 
relevant agencies and individuals.
76
  
The analysis includes 445 civil cases decided in five-justice panels from 1990 to 2011 where 
the state was a party to the proceedings, appearing either as a plaintiff or respondent.
77
 
Explanatory variables and control variables were selected based on the hypotheses outlined in 
chapter four and prior studies of judicial decisions. The majority of the variables belonging to 
the first level, the justice-level, were chosen specifically to test the results of existing research 
on judicial behavior in the Norwegian Supreme Court by Grendstad et al. (2011b; 2011c). The 
judge-specific variables used in the analysis are based on the corresponding variables coded in 
the DORANOH database.  
Case-specific variables were also retrieved from the database, with the exception of five 
variables. Application of EU and EEA law in decisions is based on the categorization 
presented by Fredriksen (2011). The complexity variable was coded primarily by the author, 
with help from research assistant Nesli Cin for the period 1990 to 2000. Whether the state 
appeared as a plaintiff or respondent in consensus cases was also coded by the author, and this 
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identification served as the basis for the selection of cases for the analysis.
78
 The presence of 
the Government Advocate and the representation of the state by the Office of the Government 
Advocate were also coded by the author. The panel-specific variables consist of aggregations 
of the individual-level variables from the DORANOH database compiled by the author.
79
 
6.1.1 Civil cases 
Civil cases are selected for the analysis of the ‘state friendly’ hypothesis because most civil 
cases that appear before the Supreme Court in Norway are questionable (Schei 2010; 2011). 
Following the advice of Kjønstad (1999, 106-107), some constraints are considered for the 
selection of cases. Other analyses have limited themselves to cases that are considerably 
questionable and cases where significant state interests are at stake. For this analysis all civil 
cases where the state was a party to the proceedings, decided in five-justice panels, are 
included. Areas of law that are considerably questionable are controlled for through the use of 
case-specific variables within a hierarchical framework.  
The selection of cases that are considerably questionable tends to be a subjective endeavor. 
Thus, to avoid subjectivity, the only requirement for selection is that the state was a party to 
the proceedings. This excludes cases where municipalities (kommuner) were party to 
proceedings against private party litigants, and also cases where municipalities appear as both 
plaintiff and respondent. Some analyses of state friendliness have included municipalities as 
an entity representing the state, but those cases are excluded from this study.
80
 The reason is 
that it is difficult to determine what constitutes state friendly voting when two municipalities 
meet in court. To avoid subjective classifications of decisions in cases where municipalities, 
and not the state, are party to proceedings against private party litigants are excluded. 
Criminal cases are also left out of the analysis because the state generally does not have a 
particular interest vested in criminal cases adjudicated by the Court, as these cases typically 
deal with due process protection.      
 
 
                                                          
78
 The possible outcomes of a case decided in five-justice panels where a state win or loss is recorded are the 
following: 5-0; 4-1; 3-2; 2-3; 1-4; and 0-5. 
79
 Appendix B details the procedure for coding additional variables. 
80




6.1.2 Selection bias 
The Norwegian Supreme Court has a discretionary jurisdiction similar to that of the United 
States Supreme Court. An Appeals Selection deals with both interlocutory orders and 
decisions; the Committee might decide the matter, refuse or grant leave to appeal (Sunde 
2011a, 6). The Court’s selection procedure raises the potential for selection bias in the 
inferences drawn from its cases (Kastellec and Lax 2008, 408). According to Kastellec and 
Lax (2008, 436) scholars can draw conclusions within a single set of cases, so long as it is 
recognized that any effects of case factors so measured cannot be said to represent general 
preferences of the judges over all cases or as applied to other sets of cases. The main problem 
is that inferences drawn from a selection of cases only represent a portion of the cases 
considered for adjudication by the Court. An example would be to apply the results from an 
analysis of civil cases in a prediction of the outcome of criminal cases.  
There is another issue related to the selection of cases with regard to inferences. Kastellec 
(2012, 1) assert that “whether judicial diversity has large-scale consequences depends on 
whether it leads to differences not just in individual voting by judges, but also to differences 
in case outcomes”. Considering that the votes of the justices rather than case outcomes serves 
as the basis for the statistical analysis, inferences can be made for the effect of various 
predictors on individual justices’ votes but not for the effect of individuals on case outcomes. 
Estimations of individual effects on case outcomes require a different analytical framework.
81
  
Acting as a court of last resort, the Norwegian Supreme Court only adjudicates cases where 
the decision will have an impact beyond the case in question (Schei 2010, 13; 2011, 7).
82
 
Cases are selected because they are complex, controversial, or in some other way considered 
important. The selection of cases varies over time: a given area of law might receive attention 
for a shorter period of time before disappearing from the docket for a prolonged period. When 
the Court deems that the issues within that area of law have been clarified, it moves on to 
other areas of concern. Thus the precise selection strategy employed by the justices will affect 
the set of Supreme Court cases observed in a given area of the law in a given time period 
(Kastellec and Lax 2008, 408). Consequently, “conclusions about judicial behavior may vary 
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by court, by judge, and by case, or even by the time period in which decisions are rendered” 
(Friedman 2006, 271).  
6.1.3 Five-justice panels 
Five-justice panels were selected for the analysis due to the inclusion of a panel-level in the 
hierarchical model. The explanatory variables at this level are easier to interpret when only 
decisions in five-justice panels have to be considered. For decisions in Grand Chamber and 
plenary session a threshold for influence would have to be specified rather than a simple 
dichotomous variable indicating whether the panel is homogenous or not.
83
 This is also the 
reason for not including a variable controlling for cases where constitutional issues are 
present. If the Court considers a case concerning the relationship between law and 
constitution they are likely to meet in Grand Chamber or plenary session. A variable 
indicating the presence of a constitutional issue in a case would thus fail to signify the 
importance of constitutional issues if the sample only consists of decisions in five-justice 
panels. The number of cases heard in Grand Chamber and plenary session are low enough 
that their absence will not have a significant impact on the other explanatory variables. The 
consequence for the analysis when excluding decisions in Grand Chamber and plenary 
session is that inference can only be made for decisions in five-justice panels. 
6.2 Variables 
In addition to the outcome variable, 24 variables are included in the analysis. The structure of 
the following sub-sections is reflecting the hierarchical structure of the data and the 
corresponding hypotheses listed in table 4.1. First the explanatory variables for each level in 
the model are outlined, before the control variables are presented in relation to the level they 
correspond to. The theoretical justification for including each variable is presented briefly, in 
addition to the expected direction of the outcome and how they are coded for the analysis. A 
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Table 6.1. Variable descriptions 
Variable Operationalization Hyp. relationship Mean 
justiceforstate 
1 = Pro state 
(dep. variable)  .638 
0 = Against state 
Level-one explanatory variables 
    flegisdep 1 = Former employment leg. dep. 
+ .422 
 
0 = No 
  fgovadv 1 = Former employment Gov't advocate 
+ .374 
 
0 = No 
  fpubpros 
1 = Former employment Pub. pros. 
+ .074 
0 = No 
  osloborn 
1 = Born in oslo 
+ .348 
0 = Elsewhere 
  appgov 
1 = Social democratic appointment 
+ .636 
0 = Non-socialist 
Level-one control variables 
  
  fprivprac 
1 = Private practice 
-  .442 
0 = No 
  lawprof 
1 = Law professor 
-  .148 
0 = No 
  fjudge 
1 = Former judge 
+ .462 
0 = No 
  female 
1 = Female 
(no expected direction) .244 
0 = Male 
  c_age Age measured in years +  .022 
  interim 
1 = Interim justice 
+  .035 
0 = Associate justice 
  chief 
1 = Chief 
(no expected direction)  .037 
0 = No 
  c_seniority Time spent at the Supreme Court + .012 
  post2002 
1 = Appointment post 2002 
(no expected direction) .157 
0 = Appointment pre 2002 
Level-two explanatory variables (panel) 
     p4legisdep 1 = Four-justice majority (flegisdep) 
+ .077 
 
0 = No 
  pappgov 
1 = Homogenous panel (appgov) 
+ .059 
0 = No 
Level-two control variables (panel) 
  
  pchief 
1 = Chief in panel 
(no expected direction) .187 
0 = Chief not in panel 
Level-two explanatory variables (case) 
  
  govadvocate 
1 = Gov't Advocate present 
+ .029 
0 = Not present 
  plaintiff 
1 = State is plaintiff 
+ .330 
0 = State is respondent 
  econ 
1 = Economic issue 
+ .444 
0 = No 
  eueea 
1 = Case concerning EU or EEA 
+ .029 
0 = No 
Level-two control variables (case) 
    c_complex Complexity measured by legal references (no expected direction)  -.007 
  dissent 
1 = Dissent 
+ .237 





6.2.1 The dependent variable 
The dependent variable indicates whether the justices voted for or against the state in civil 
cases decided in five-justice panels where the state was a party to the proceedings, appearing 
either as a plaintiff or respondent (justiceforstate). The variable is dichotomous, with the 
value 1 indicating a vote pursuant of the state and the value 0 indicating a vote against the 
state. For a hierarchical model the effect of individual-level predictors on justices’ votes is 
interesting, especially compared to the effects of variables at higher levels in the analysis. The 
amount of variance explained by the panel levels is also of a particular interest. At this point it 
is important to recall that the consequences of judicial diversity depend on whether it leads to 
differences not only in the votes of individual justices, but also to differences in case 
outcomes (Kastellec 2012, 1). Decisions are not merely a collective expression of individual 
preferences or the application of legal rules. Case outcomes are a result of complex 
interactions of rules, preferences and structures (Brace and Hall 1993, 26). In studies of the 
votes of individual justices it is not possible to assess whether the predictors cause differences 
not only in individual behavior, but also in case outcomes.  
6.2.2 Level-one explanatory factors – justice predictors 
The explanatory variables included at the first-level of the hierarchical model account for the 
attitudinal and personal attributes approaches to studies of judicial decisions. Personal 
preferences and attitudes cannot be measured reliably by direct measures. Thus, indirect 
measures, or proxies, are frequently applied by researchers. The nature of the justices’ 
previous legal career has been identified as a probable cause of state friendly voting on the 
Norwegian Supreme Court (e.g., Kjønstad 1999). Grendstad et al. (2011b) tested the effect of 
prior employment with the Legislation Department, the Office of the Government Advocate, 
and the Office of the Director General of Public Prosecutions. These variables are also 
included here (flegisdep, fgovadv, fpubpros). The three variables are coded dichotomously, 
where the value one indicates former employment with a public agency and zero no former 
employment. 
An indication of the appointing government is the fourth variable included at the first-level of 
the model (appgov). In attitudinal approaches it is as already mentioned necessary to include 
proxies for measures of ideology and personal preferences. These attributes cannot be 




international literature appointing government is established as an appropriate proxy for 
measuring basic political preferences (e.g., Segal and Spaeth 2002). Grendstad et al. (2011b; 
2011c) have found significant effects of ideology on the votes of Supreme Court justices in 
decisions in the Norwegian Supreme Court when applying appointing government as a proxy 
for ideology.  
However, the use of appointing government as a proxy is disputed. Supreme Court justices’ 
Schei (2011) and Skoghøy (2011a) have criticized the approach taken by Grendstad et al. 
claiming that if they knew the appointment procedure it would become obvious that 
appointing government as a measure of ideology is essentially pointless. Schei and Skoghøy 
do have some valid points, which are also dealt with by Grendstad et al. (2012b) in a more 
recent paper where they develop an alternative measure of ideology based on expert surveys. 
Due to the fact that the new measure only covers the current members of the Court, 
appointing government is used as a proxy for ideology in this analysis.  
The expectation is that the effect of the appointing government is moderated by the other 
variables introduced at the judge-level. Like the previous variables introduced to the analysis 
the measure of the appointing government is coded as a dichotomous variable where the value 
one indicates an appointment by a social-democratic government and the value zero indicates 
an appointment by a non-social democratic government. Judges appointed by social-
democratic governments are expected to have a higher inclination to favor the state over 
private parties than judges appointed by non-social democratic governments.  
Whether or not a justice was born in Oslo constitutes the basis for the final hypothesis at the 
judge-level. Background characteristics are central to decisional behavior according to 
attitudinal perspectives, and one such measure is the place of birth. Grendstad et al. (2011c, 
10) identifies the historical tension between center and periphery in the Norwegian political 
history as a potential extra-legal factor influencing decisions. The center-periphery effect is 
expected to be caused by the concentration of elite players in the capital (Shaffer, Grendstad, 
and Waltenburg 2011, 18).  Justices born in Oslo are anticipated to be more likely to side with 
the government due to an Oslo-cephalic outlook. The variable is dichotomous, with the value 
one indicating that a judge was born in Oslo and the value zero indicating that the judge was 





6.2.3 Level-two explanatory factors – panel predictors 
To test the effect of collegiality panel-specific explanatory variables are included in the 
analysis. This is the third aspect of the state friendly hypothesis discussed in chapter four. 
Chief Justice Schei (2004, 138) and Kjønstad (1999, 97) have pointed out that the legal 
environment of the Court can have an impact on the decisional behavior of the justices. This 
is also mentioned by Skoghøy (2011b, 15), who views the increase in judicial review by the 
Supreme Court as a consequence of the broadening recruitment to the Court. U.S. research 
also suggests that the context in which judges decide cases has a significant impact on their 
decisions (e.g., Meinke and Scott 2007). A judge is not only expected to be influenced by her 
own legal views, but also those of her colleagues (Kastellec 2011b, 378). 
Two variables are included at this level (p4legisdep, pappgov). They are aggregations of 
individual-level variables, and indicate whether a panel is homogenous, in case of the 
aggregation of appointing government, and dominated by a majority, in case of the aggregated 
variable indicating former employment with the Legislation Department. Both variables have 
an expected direction where there is a positive increase in the probability of an outcome 
pursuant of the state. They are coded dichotomously, with the value one indicating a 
homogenous panel or majority panel, and the value zero a heterogeneous panel.  
6.2.4 Level-two explanatory factors – case predictors 
Explanatory factors at the case-level are included in the analysis to test the effect of different 
legal-variables and case-related variables to see whether legal constraints influence the 
outcome of judicial decisions. Several recent studies have investigated the influence of case-
level factors and legal variables on judicial decisions to account for the effect of the law in 
decisions (e.g., Bartels 2011; Benesh and Spaeth; Gillman 2001; Lax and Rader 2010; 
Wahlbeck et al. 1999). The first factor included at the case-level is a dichotomous variable 
indicating the presence of the Government Advocate (govadvocate).
84
 Important cases are 
expected to increase the likelihood of an outcome pursuant to the state. The presence of the 
Government Advocate rather than another lawyer from the Office of the Government 
Advocate or another entity representing the state’s interests can be taken as an indication of 
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importance. In the United States, Bailey, Kamoie, and Maltzman (2005) and McAtee and 
McGuire (2007) found that the presence of the United States Solicitor General has a 
significant influence on the Supreme Court. Their results suggest that the Solicitor General 
has a direct impact on decisions reached by the Court; not only as an apolitical legal expert 
but also as a political actor. The Norwegian Government Advocate has a similar position 




Whether the state appears as a plaintiff or respondent is the second explanatory variable 
included at the case-level (plaintiff). In the majority of the civil cases appearing before the 
Supreme Court the state is the appellee, meaning that it won in the previous instance. The 
probability of a result pursuant to the state’s interests is thus higher than for the appellant 
(Fagernæs 2007). Government Advocate Fagernæs (2007) has explained that the state is 
restrictive when it comes to appealing to the Supreme Court, and as a result it is expected that 
the state wins more cases than it loses. The variable is coded dichotomously, with the value 
one indicating that the state is the appellee and the value zero indicating that it is the 
appellant.  
The higher limit on expenditures and greater resources of the state relative to private parties is 
another of the factors expected to influence case outcomes (e.g, Ryssdal 2007). Economic 
cases are by definition important for the state, and it is expected that the presence of economic 
issues will affect outcomes (econ). Grendstad et al. (2011c) identified cases concerning 
economic interests as a field where political preferences are likely to surface in non-
unanimous decisions. However, Tellesbø (2006, 77) notes that in tax related cases the 
resources are more evenly distributed, which leads to a lower victory rate for the state. Skiple 
(2012) support this notion when indicating that some economic cases are more salient than 
others. This differentiation is, however, not applied here. There is not enough data on legal 
categories for decisions in civil cases to test for different economic issues, such as tax-law and 
social-security law. Economic issues are measured by a dichotomous variable coded one if the 
case concerns an economic issue and zero if not. 
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Fredriksen (2011) has suggested that the outcome of Supreme Court decisions in cases 
dealing with EU law and EEA law can be taken to indicate that the Court is exhibiting a state 
friendly nature.
86
 This is based on the fact that the state has won the majority of important 
cases where EU and EEA law have been the central issues. However, Fredriksen (2011, 97) 
also notes that the state has not appealed several cases where principal questions were at 
stake, which suggests that the statistics may not provide a complete picture of the role EU and 
EEA law plays in court cases. None the less, this is another important area of law, which may 
indicate whether the Court has a state friendly inclination. The variable is dichotomous, coded 
one if EU and EEA law are central issues and zero if they are not present (eueea).   
6.2.5 Level-one control variables – justice predictors 
Ten control variables are included at the judge-level of the model. Three of these variables 
serve as controls for the effect of previous legal career (privprac, lawprof, fjudge). Contrary to 
the variables indicating public employment introduced as explanatory factors two of these 
variables are not expected to increase the probability of an outcome pursuant of the public 
party. Former employment in a private practice and former employment at a university as a 
law professor are expected to moderate the influence of former public employment. Former 
employment as a judge in a lower instance, on the other hand, is expected to increase the 
likelihood of a vote pursuant of the state. This expectation is based on the significant impact 
of former employment as a judge on the probability of voting in favor of the government 
identified by Jacobsen (2011). The variables are dichotomous, with the value one indicating 
former employment and the value zero no former employment. 
Social background of the justices is controlled for by two variables. The gender of the judges 
is the first of these variables expected to impact policy choices. A number of studies have 
found significant effects of the impact of gender on decisions (e.g., Boyd, Epstein, and Martin 
2010; Collins, Manning, and Carp 2010; Farhang and Wawro 2004; McCall 2008; Songer et 
al. 2010). While it is not expected to have a substantial impact on a state friendly voting, the 
gender of the justices still have to be included as a control variable in the analysis. The 
variable is given the value one for female justices and zero for male justices (female).  
Grendstad et al. (2011b, 18) hypothesize that a conservative defense of the status quo might 
produce a state friendly predisposition. When people get older they tend to become more 
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conservative. Consequently, the older the judges get the more likely they are to defend the 
status quo, which for the purpose of the state friendly discussion is the social welfare system. 
Age is thus included as a control variable. The variable is metric, indicating the justices’ age 
(c_age). In the analysis this variable is grand mean centered to give it the interpretation of an 
average justice rather than the value zero, which does not provide a substantial interpretative 
meaning.   
Appointment as an interim justice is also included as a control variable (interim). Temporary 
justices are not appointed based on an independent recommendation from the Judicial 
Appointments Board. Consequently they can in theory be selected based on their view on 
policy issues, or lack thereof (Smith 2012, 159-161). Interim justices are not independent of 
the executive branch of government, hence it is necessary to control for their impact on case 
outcomes. The variable is coded dichotomously, with the value one indicating an interim 
justice and the value zero an associate justice. It is expected that interim justices have a higher 
probability of voting for the state than associate justices.  
Similar to interim justices the Chief Justice is expected influence decisions, and is therefore 
included as a control variable both at the individual- and panel-level (chief, pchief). The chief 
Justice serves as the presiding justice regardless of seniority. When the justices meet in 
council the presiding judge always takes the floor first. If the Chief Justice is present he will 
account for the facts of the case and the views of the different parties involved. He will then 
present his views on the case, what issues are present and how these should be solved (Schei 
2010). International research suggests that the Chief Justice has unique reasons for 
discouraging conflict in the courts (e.g., Brenner and Hagle 1996; Wahlbeck et al. 1999, 498). 
There is no explicit hypothesis for the Chief Justice regarding his impact on state friendly 
outcomes at the individual-level (the panel level is considered in the next sub-section). 
Jacobsen (2011) found a negative effect of being the Chief Justice and voting in favor of the 
state, and that is the expectation here as well. The variable is coded one for the Chief Justice 
and zero for other justices.  
Seniority and appointment after 2002 are the final variables included at the judge-level of the 
analysis (c_seniority, post2002). If the Court is exhibiting a state friendly inclination due to 
the socialization process and collegial interactions of the judges, it is expected that a judge 




included in the analysis. An appointment after the establishment of the Judicial Appointment 
Board in 2002 is also included to control for the effect of new appointment procedures. 
Seniority is measured in years by subtracting the date of appointment from the date the vote 
was cast. The variable is grand mean centered. Appointment after 2002 is a dichotomous 
variable where the value one indicates appointment after 2002 and the value zero appointment 
before 2002. 
6.2.6 Level-two control variables – panel predictors 
There is only one control variable introduced at the panel-level. As discussed above, the chief 
justice may have reasons for discouraging conflict and promoting a unified voice of the Court. 
A control variable is thus included to control for the effect of the chief justice being part of a 
panel (p_chief). There is not an explicit hypothesis for the effect the presence of the chief in a 
panel, but the expected direction is that the presence of the chief reduces the probability of a 
favorable outcome for the state. The variable is coded dichotomously, with the value one 
indicating the presence of the Chief Justice.  
6.2.7 Level-two control variables – case predictors 
Control variables are introduced at each level of the model. At the case-level, a variable 
measuring case complexity and a variable indicating dissent are included. The complexity of a 
case is expected to lead judges to disagree about the locations of policy alternatives (e.g., 
Edelman, Klein, and Lindquist 2008; Lindquist, Martinek, and Hettinger 2007; Wahlbeck et 
al. 1999). One would thus expect to see an increase in separate opinions in complex cases. 
This is a new measure introduced in analyses of state friendliness on the Norwegian Supreme 
Court, but it has frequently been applied in the American literature (e.g., Collins 2008). The 
variable is included as a control, but there is no expected direction of the relationship. 
Complexity is measured by counting the number of legal sources cited in individual cases 
(c_complex). The variable is grand mean centered.   
An indicator of dissent is the second control variable introduced at the case-level (dissent). 
The research on judicial behavior on the Norwegian Supreme Court has been preoccupied 
with analyses of cases with dissenting opinions. Grendstad et al. (2011b, 20) argue that non-
unanimous cases are specifically interesting because by themselves the legal sources fail to 
account for disagreement among the judges in these cases. In these cases ideology is assumed 




measured differ in consensus decisions and decisions with dissenting opinions. The variable is 
dichotomous, with the value one indicating dissent and the value zero indicating consensus. 
6.3 Validity and reliability of the data 
The question inherent in any social science study is whether “the observations meaningfully 
capture the ideas contained in the concepts” (Adcock and Collier 2001, 529). In this chapter 
the operationalization of the variables has suggested that the face validity of the theoretical 
concepts is retained when they are quantified and presented as variables. The 
operationalizations introduced in the thesis are based on measures already established in 
literature on judicial behavior, thus there is not an extensive discussion of their validity 
presented here.  
Reliability of the data is satisfactory considering that it is based on quantifications of 
published judicial decisions. As with any statistical analysis there is a potential for errors 
being introduced in the data when observations are coded. The Lovdata Foundation legal 
information system is not a research tool, but rather an aid for practicing lawyers. However, 
with good routines for entering and controlling the data the risk of bias is reduced.
87
 There 
may be random errors in the individual variables, but there is not a consistent bias in the data 
caused by the coding procedure.
88
 The relatively large selection of cases reduces the risk of 
bias in the analysis due to errors in the observations.   
Being a rather underdeveloped field, research on judicial behavior in Norway will take the 
form of a combination of exploratory and theory-testing analysis.
89
 The results will not be 
directly applicable beyond the cases in question, keeping in mind the points raised by 
Kastellec and Lax regarding conclusions, but they will give an indication of the relationship 
between the explanatory factors and the votes of the justices. By unveiling factors influencing 
judicial decisions one can better predict the outcome of cases, both in the past and the future. 
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 The procedure for entering observations in the DORANOH-database, which also includes a discussion of the 
potential for errors, is covered in the report Expanding DORANOH June-August 2011 by Skiple and Bergset 
(2011). 
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 See appendix B for details of the coding procedure. 
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 Limited from a political science point of view. Recent developments such as the establishment of the 
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Chapter 7 - Analysis and results 
Within the theoretical framework established in chapter three and four the results of the 
hierarchical model presented in chapter five is assessed in this chapter. First the result of an 
unconditional model is reviewed, and the intraclass correlation is computed to empirically 
assess whether a multilevel model is appropriate. Then the unconditional model is expanded 
in several steps to include explanatory variables and control variables at level-one and level-
two. For each step in the process the model fit is evaluated using information criteria and 
likelihood-ratio tests. After a full model including predictors at both level-one and level-two 
has been established, a reduced model is presented. In the reduced model each predictor’s 
impact on the model fit has been assessed individually rather than in blocks of several 
predictors. The reduced model is then compared to the full model. In conclusion the 
theoretical expectations of the analysis and the hypotheses established in chapter four are 
evaluated in light of the results of the hierarchical regression analysis.   
7.1 A two-level model  
The two-level hierarchical generalized linear model outlined in chapter five is the point of 
departure for the analysis of judicial decisions. When multilevel data is analyzed one usually 
start with a simple model, before expanding it in several interconnected steps to include 
random effects. An unconditional model without predictors serves as the baseline model. 
When the intraclass correlation coefficient has been calculated to assess the multilevel 
structure empirically, predictors are added to the individual-level and panel-level in turn. 
After a complex model with predictors at both levels has been established, a reduced model is 
considered with regard to parsimony. Only the final model is reviewed in detail with regard to 
the impact of the predictors on the outcome variable. The estimation method for the models is 
maximum likelihood with mean and variance adaptive Gauss–Hermite quadrature.
90
 Units 
with missing values are omitted from the analysis, resulting in available data on 2,217 justices 
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 The exceptions are two models estimated with reweighted iterative generalized least squares with second order 
penalized quasi-likelihood approximation. Models based on maximum likelihood estimation were fitted using 
the xtlogit-command in the statistical package Stata (StataCorp 2011b). Attempts were also made to fit the 
maximum likelihood models with the Stata commands xtmelogit and gllamm, but convergence issues occurred 
when the model complexity increased. For models based on penalized quasi-likelihood the runmlwin-command 
(Leckie and Charlton 2011) was applied in Stata to trigger model estimation in the statistical package MLwiN 






 Model fit is assessed with the Akaike information criteria and the Bayesian 
information criteria, in addition to likelihood-ratio tests.
92
 The threshold for accepting a model 
based on the likelihood-ratio tests is set at ten-percent. 
7.1.1 An unconstrained model 
As discussed in section 5.1.2 there are several ways of determining the requirement for a 
multilevel model in statistical analyses. The theoretical discussions in chapter three and four, 
in addition to the formal framework established in chapter five and the overview of the data 
structure presented in chapter six provide theoretical and statistical justifications for the 
application of a multilevel framework in the analysis. To empirically assess the requirement 
for a hierarchical model an unconstrained, or unconditional, model has to be estimated. From 
the unconditional model the intraclass correlation coefficient (ρ) can be calculated as 
discussed in section 5.2.2. This will identify “the proportion of the variance explained by the 
grouping structure in the population” (Hox 2010, 15). In the judicial decisions data the 
intraclass correlation coefficient indicate the proportion of the variance of a justice’ vote for 
or against the state explained by the hierarchical structure of the data. Stated differently; the 
variance in individual votes for or against the state explained by the judicial panels and case-
specific variables. The results from the unconditional model fitted to the judicial decisions 
data are presented in table 7.1. Intraclass correlation is estimated by calculating the ratio of 
the level-two variance to the sum of the level-one and level-two variances. The estimation is 
based on a latent variable approach as discussed in sub-section 5.2.3.  
The unconditional model presented in table 7.1. indicates an estimated 92 percent probability 
of voting for the state.
93
 However, the unconditional model estimated with penalized quasi-
likelihood suggests a probability of 73 percent, which is closer to the population mean of .64. 
It appears that the model estimated with maximum likelihood overestimates the probability of 
a vote for the state. The intraclass correlation coefficient indicates that 92.5 percent of the 
variance in the unconstrained model is explained by the grouping structure of the data (table 
7.1). This is a relatively large coefficient, but a substantial intraclass correlation was expected 
due to the high number of cases with unanimous decisions and the low number of cases with 
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 With 445 panels included in the analysis the minimum threshold for good estimates in multilevel designs, 
identified as 50 level-two units by Maas and Hox (2004, 135), is surpassed by a substantial margin. Hence the 
sample size is not introducing bias in the analysis.  
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 An overview of model selection based on information criteria is presented by Hamaker et al. (2011). 
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non-unanimous decisions. A large intraclass correlation is an empirical justification for 
employing multilevel analysis. The difference between the maximum likelihood estimates and 
the refitted model with second order penalized quasi-likelihood linearization (pql2) suggests 
that the maximum likelihood estimate of the variance might have an upward bias.
94
 Quasi-
likelihood estimation provides more moderate results, and in light of the theoretical 
framework the lower variance value is sensible.
95
  
Table 7.1. An unconstrained two-level model of state friendly voting         
  
Unconstrained model Unconstrained model (pql2) 
Variables   Coef. S.E. exp(b) S.E. Coef. S.E. exp(b) S.E. 
Fixed effects 
          Intercept 
 
2.539*** (0.370) 12.66 (4.689) 0.984*** (0.210) 2.675 (0.562) 
          Random effects 












  ρ 
 
.925 .747 
AIC 1656.238 - 
BIC 1667.681 - 




N(panels)   445 445 
Standard errors in parentheses 
       *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
      pql2 = second order penalized quasi-likelihood linearization 
     
Although quasi-likelihood appear to yield more robust results than the numerical estimation 
with maximum-likelihood, the application of a quasi-likelihood approach entails constraint 
issues. Reweighted iterative generalized least squares with second order penalized quasi-
likelihood approximation is not based on maximum likelihood estimation, and consequently 
likelihood-tests and information criteria are not available for assessing model fit (Hox 2010, 
120).
96
 Maximum likelihood estimation is thus retained for the buildup of the hierarchical 
model to enable likelihood ratio tests as new variables are added to the model. The 
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 Penalized quasi-likelihood is equivalent to maximum restricted likelihood estimation.  
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 Hox (2010, 121-123) note that second order penalized quasi-likelihood has a tendency to underestimate 
regression coefficients and variance components. When there is a combination of small groups and a high 
intraclass correlation quasi-likelihood can produce a severe bias (Hox 2010, 139). Considering the exploratory 
nature of this study type I errors are preferable to type II errors. Hence penalized quasi-likelihood is applied as a 
robustness check.   
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exploratory nature of the analysis and the fact that the threshold for significant values is set at 
ten percent suggests that the use of maximum likelihood is unlikely to inflict bias in the 
estimates.
97
 To test the robustness of the model estimated by maximum likelihood, the final 
model is also fitted with second order penalized quasi-likelihood.  
Table 7.2. Two-level model of state friendly voting - level-one predictors (model one and two)     
  
Level-one explanatory predictors Level-one control predictors 
Variables   Coef. S.E. exp(b) S.E. Coef. S.E. exp(b) S.E. 
Fixed effects 
          flegisdep 
 
0.679*** (0.210) 1.972 (0.414) 0.558** (0.280) 1.747 (0.489) 
  fgovadv 
 
-0.070 (0.212) 0.933 (0.198) -0.203 (0.309) 0.816 (0.252) 
  fpubpros 
 
0.353 (0.381) 1.424 (0.542) -0.306 (0.542) 0.736 (0.399) 
  osloborn 
 
-0.056 (0.214) 0.946 (0.202) 0.083 (0.256) 1.086 (0.278) 
  appgov 
 
-0.142 (0.222) 0.868 (0.192) 0.052 (0.242) 1.053 (0.255) 
  fprivprac 
     
-0.136 (0.338) 0.873 (0.295) 
  fjudge 
     
0.370 (0.288) 1.447 (0.416) 
  lawprof 
     
-0.726* (0.439) 0.484 (0.213) 
  female 
     
-0.643** (0.320) 0.526 (0.168) 
  c_age 
     
0.021 (0.025) 1.021 (0.025) 
  interim 
     
0.654 (0.678) 1.923 (1.304) 
  chief 
     
-1.245* (0.715) 0.288 (0.206) 
  c_seniority 
    
-0.030 (0.027) 0.971 (0.026) 
  post2002 
     
-0.062 (0.399) 0.940 (0.375) 
  Intercept 
 
2.433*** (0.419) 11.39 (4.773) 2.642*** (0.625) 14.05 (8.780) 
Random effects 



























N(panels)   445 445 
Standard errors in parentheses   
      *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
       
                                                          
97
 Models included in the analysis are fitted with 30 integration points when the xtlogit-command is used. The 
sensitivity of the results relative to the number of integration points has been assessed statistically with refitted 
quadrature approximation. All variables were within the relative difference of 0.01 percent suggested by the 
Stata manual (StataCorp 2011a, 11) when the reduced model was refitted with 60 and 120 integration points. The 
exceptions were three level-two variables. To account for this deviation a model with second order penalized 
quasi-likelihood linearization is applied to test the robustness of the reduced model based with maximum 




7.1.2 Level-one explanatory variables – justice predictors 
Adding level-one explanatory predictors is the second step in the estimation process. The 
variables introduced in model one are based on hypotheses h1.1 through h1.6 established in 
section 4.5.1. The intraclass correlation increased slightly from the unconditional model to 
model one, suggesting that the introduction of level-one explanatory variables did not 
improve the model.
98
 However, the AIC and BIC values decreased along with the log 
likelihood, suggesting a better model fit (table 7.2). This is supported by the likelihood-ratio 
test presented in table 7.3, which confirms that model one provides a better fit than the 
unconditional model (table 7.1). Former employment with the Legislation Department is the 
only significant effect, and consequently only hypothesis h1.2 is supported by the findings 
thus far (table 7.2).
99
 This is interesting considering the significant effects of appointing 
government and former employment with the Director General of Public Prosecutions found 
by Grendstad et al. (2011b). The inclusion of unanimous and non-unanimous cases decided 
between 1990 and 2010 in the analysis rather than non-unanimous cases decided between 
1945 and 2009 may account for the differing results. However, the results from a logistic 
analysis of government friendly voting on the Norwegian Supreme Court in non-unanimous 
decisions between 1991 and 2009 by Jacobsen (2011) were similar to the findings in table 7.2. 
This indicates that the different time periods can be responsible for some of the variation in 
the results.  
Table 7.3. Likelihood-ratio tests of the unconstrained model and model one and model one and model two 
Unconstrained model nested in model one 
    LR chi2(5)  =  12.30 
      Prob > chi2 =  0.031 
      
        Model one nested in model two 
     LR chi2(9)  =  17.19 
      Prob > chi2 =  0.046 
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 Due to the nature of multilevel logistic regression model, as outlined in section 5.2, level-one variance is fixed. 
When level-one predictors are added to the analysis the effect is an increase in the random-effect variance terms 
and the absolute value of the regression coefficients rather than a decrease in the level-one variance (Hedeker 
2008, 241). 
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7.1.3 Level-one control variables – justice predictors 
Model two in table 7.2. represents the next expansion of the analysis. In this model control 
variables are introduced at level-one, expanding the model to include both explanatory 
predictors and control predictors at the individual-level. The information criteria increased 
from model one indicating a worse fit, but the log likelihood decreased (table 7.2). A 
likelihood-ratio test of model one nested in model two does indicate that the fit has improved 
as suggested by the log likelihood, and model two is thus kept as the base model for the 
introduction of level-two predictors (table 7.3).  
Three control variables have significant effects at the individual-level. Both the effect of 
being female and the effect of being the Chief Justice have a negative impact on voting for the 
state. This is also the direction of the effect resulting from being a law professor. 
Interestingly, model two does not indicate a significant effect of being appointed after 2002 
nor is there an effect of seniority or age present. Perhaps most interesting is the absence of an 
effect of having worked in a private practice prior to appointment to the Court. With the 
introduction of control-variables the effect of former employment with the Legislation 
Department has decreased slightly, and the estimates are now significant at a five-percent 
level rather than at the one-percent level. The other level-one explanatory variables remain 
insignificant (table 7.2).  
7.1.4 Level-two explanatory variables – panel predictors 
The introduction of explanatory variables at the second-level of the analysis displays the 
hierarchical structure of the model. Variables are introduced in two different blocks at this 
level. First the explanatory variables and control variables for the panel-specific factors are 
introduced in model three and model four (table 7.4). Then the explanatory variables and 
control variables relating to case specific factors are added to the analysis in models five, six 
and seven (table 7.6 and table 7.8).  
Hypotheses h2.1 and h2.2 appear to be confirmed by the panel-specific explanatory variables 
included in model four (table 7.4). The effect of homogenous panels where all five justices 
were appointed by a social-democratic government and the effect of a four justice majority 
with background from the Legislation Department are both significant at the one-percent 
level. With the inclusion of the level-two explanatory predictors the strength of the level-one 




insignificant. As expected the intraclass correlation was reduced from model two (table 7.2), 
and the likelihood-ratio test of model two nested in model three indicated a better model fit 
(table 7.5). The value of the AIC is lower as anticipated, but the BIC value has increased 
(table 7.4).  
Table 7.4. Two-level model of state friendly voting - level-two panel predictors (model three and four) 
  
Level-two panel explanatory predictors Level-two panel control predictors 
Variables   Coef. S.E. exp(b) S.E. Coef. S.E exp(b) S.E 
Fixed effects 
          flegisdep 
 
0.543* (0.280) 1.721 (0.482) 0.546* (0.280) 1.726 (0.483) 
  fgovadv 
 
-0.189 (0.309) 0.828 (0.256) -0.188 (0.309) 0.828 (0.256) 
  fpubpros 
 
-0.252 (0.541) 0.777 (0.421) -0.247 (0.541) 0.781 (0.423) 
  osloborn 
 
0.075 (0.255) 1.077 (0.275) 0.072 (0.255) 1.075 (0.274) 
  appgov 
 
0.021 (0.241) 1.021 (0.246) 0.018 (0.241) 1.018 (0.246) 
  fprivprac 
 
-0.122 (0.337) 0.885 (0.298) -0.122 (0.337) 0.885 (0.298) 
  fjudge 
 
0.381 (0.287) 1.464 (0.420) 0.381 (0.287) 1.463 (0.420) 
  lawprof 
 
-0.700 (0.438) 0.496 (0.217) -0.698 (0.438) 0.497 (0.218) 
  female 
 
-0.627* (0.320) 0.534 (0.171) -0.627* (0.320) 0.534 (0.171) 
  c_age 
 
0.021 (0.025) 1.021 (0.025) 0.021 (0.025) 1.022 (0.025) 
  interim 
 
0.643 (0.675) 1.902 (1.283) 0.641 (0.675) 1.899 (1.281) 
  chief 
 
-1.239* (0.712) 0.290 (0.206) -1.187* (0.714) 0.305 (0.218) 
  c_seniority -0.029 (0.027) 0.972 (0.026) -0.029 (0.027) 0.971 (0.026) 
  post2002 
 
-0.061 (0.398) 0.940 (0.374) -0.061 (0.398) 0.941 (0.374) 
  p4legisdep 
 
3.106*** (1.191) 22.33 (26.58) 3.051** (1.192) 21.14 (25.20) 
  pappgov 
 
4.162*** (1.423) 64.21 (91.34) 4.125*** (1.423) 61.85 (88.01) 
  pchief 
     
-0.604 (0.936) 0.547 (0.511) 
  Intercept 
 
2.126*** (0.631) 8.378*** (5.288) 2.241*** (0.652) 9.400*** (6.128) 
Random effects 








     
  
 






 1615.73 1617.368 
BIC 
 
 1718.4 1725.742 




N(panels)   445 445 
Standard errors in parentheses   
      *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
      
Justices are nested in panels in the data, and the same justices appear multiple times. This can 
affect the BIC value, which weights the parameters based on ln(N) rather than the constant 2 




consider the number of observations as N, but it can yield biased BIC values when units are 
interdependent. However,  considering the panels as N would result in the BIC value being 
misused if used to compare models (StataCorp 2011a, 157-159). Thus the default measure is 
retained, and the BIC value is viewed in relation to the other measures of model fit.   
 
Table 7.5. Likelihood-ratio test of models two and three and models three and four 
Model two nested in model three 
   LR chi2(2)  =  12.08 
    Prob > chi2 =  0.002 
    
      Model three nested in model four 
   LR chi2(1)  =  0.36 
    Prob > chi2 =  0.547 
     
7.1.5 Level-two control variables – panel predictors 
The presence of the chief justice in a panel is the only control variable introduced in model 
four (table 7.4). Both the BIC and AIC increased relative to model three, and the likelihood-
ratio test in table 7.5. indicates a worse model fit. The variable is not significant, and had no 
impact on the intraclass correlation. Consequently, the variable is dropped from the analysis 
before the addition of case-specific predictors in model five, six and seven (table 7.6 and table 
7.8). Model five is thus compared to model three rather than model four. 
7.1.6 Level-two explanatory variables – case predictors  
Case predictors constitute the second block added to the panel-level. In model five 
explanatory factors for hypotheses h2.5 and h2.6 are introduced (table 7.6). The intraclass 
correlation is slightly reduced with the inclusion of the new variables, but the model fit is 
worse than model three where the only variables at the second level are panel-specific 
explanatory predictors (table 7.4). Although the variable indicating the presence of an 
economic issue is significant at the ten-percent level, it is not included in the next model due 
to the model fit.  
Model six includes two additional case predictors, indicating whether the state appeared as 
plaintiff or respondent and the presence of the Government Advocate. As with model five, the 
assessment of model fit indicates that the new variables do not improve the model (table 7.6). 
This means that hypotheses h2.4 and h2.7 are not supported by the analysis, seeing that 




Table 7.6. Two-level model of state friendly voting - level-two case predictors (models five and six) 
  
Level-two explanatory case predictors Level-two explanatory case predictors 
Variables   Coef. S.E. exp(b) S.E. Coef. S.E. exp(b) S.E. 
Fixed effects 
          flegisdep 
 
0.555** (0.280) 1.741 (0.488) 0.544* (0.280) 1.723 (0.483) 
  fgovadv 
 
-0.174 (0.309) 0.840 (0.260) -0.187 (0.309) 0.829 (0.256) 
  fpubpros 
 
-0.215 (0.541) 0.807 (0.437) -0.246 (0.541) 0.782 (0.423) 
  osloborn 
 
0.065 (0.255) 1.067 (0.272) 0.078 (0.255) 1.081 (0.276) 
  appgov 
 
0.016 (0.241) 1.016 (0.245) 0.019 (0.241) 1.019 (0.246) 
  fprivprac 
 
-0.106 (0.337) 0.899 (0.303) -0.123 (0.337) 0.884 (0.298) 
  fjudge 
 
0.394 (0.287) 1.483 (0.426) 0.383 (0.287) 1.466 (0.421) 
  lawprof 
 
-0.678 (0.438) 0.508 (0.222) -0.693 (0.438) 0.500 (0.219) 
  female 
 
-0.617* (0.320) 0.540 (0.173) -0.622* (0.320) 0.537 (0.172) 
  c_age 
 
0.021 (0.025) 1.022 (0.025) 0.021 (0.025) 1.021 (0.025) 
  interim 
 
0.640 (0.674) 1.897 (1.278) 0.641 (0.674) 1.897 (1.279) 
  chief 
 
-1.218* (0.712) 0.296 (0.211) -1.243* (0.712) 0.289 (0.205) 
  c_seniority -0.028 (0.027) 0.972 (0.026) -0.029 (0.027) 0.972 (0.026) 
  post2002 
 
-0.051 (0.398) 0.951 (0.379) -0.054 (0.398) 0.948 (0.377) 
  p4legisdep 
 
3.153*** (1.209) 23.41 (28.31) 3.196*** (1.192) 24.43 (29.13) 
  pappgov 
 
4.020*** (1.435) 55.72 (79.98) 4.117*** (1.441) 61.38 (88.48) 
  econ 
 
-1.259* (0.696) 0.284 (0.198) 
      eueea 
 
2.010 (1.910) 7.460 (14.25) 
      plaintiff 
     
-1.047 (0.749) 0.351 (0.263) 
  govadvocate 
    
1.673 (2.058) 5.330 (10.97) 
  Intercept 
 
2.598*** (0.692) 13.44*** (9.301) 2.393*** (0.673) 10.95*** (7.370) 
Random effects 








     
  
 






1615.878  1617.144 
BIC 
 
 1729.956  1731.223 




N(panels)   445 445 
Standard errors in parentheses 
      *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
       
Table 7.7. Likelihood-ratio test of models three and five and models three and six 
Model three nested in model five 
   LR chi2(2)   =  3.85 
     Prob > chi2 =  0.146 
    
      Model three nested in model six 
   LR chi2(2)  =  2.59 
    Prob > chi2 =  0.275 




7.1.7 Level-two control variables – case predictors 
Two control variables are added to the analysis in model seven (table 7.8). Compared to 
model three model seven provides a better fit. The values of the information criteria have 
been reduced, and the likelihood-ratio test presented in table 7.9. confirms these changes. The 
intraclass correlation has also been reduced slightly, indicating that some of the variance is 
explained by the addition of the control variables for the case-predictors. These predictors 
moderate the effect of the panel-specific explanatory variables. Dissent is a control for cases 
with dissenting opinions, and the variable is significant at the one-percent level. Prior research 
on judicial behavior in Norway has focused on cases with dissenting opinions, and how 
personal attributes can influence decisions in these cases. Thus the significant effect of the 
predictor is interesting, and warrants further investigation. The measure of case complexity, 
on the other hand, is not significant. In total, six predictors – former employment with the 
Legislation Department; being female; being the Chief justice; a four justice panel majority 
with background from the Legislation Department; a homogenous panel with appointments by 
a social democratic government; and dissenting opinions – are significant for a justice’ vote 















Table 7.8. Two-level model of state friendly voting - level-two case predictors (model seven) 
  
Level-two control case predictors     
Variables   Coef. S.E. exp(b) S.E. 
  Fixed effects 
        flegisdep 
 
0.549** (0.280) 1.732 (0.485) 
    fgovadv 
 
-0.165 (0.308) 0.848 (0.261) 
    fpubpros 
 
-0.209 (0.541) 0.811 (0.439) 
    osloborn 
 
0.073 (0.255) 1.075 (0.274) 
    appgov 
 
0.023 (0.241) 1.023 (0.247) 
    fprivprac 
 
-0.105 (0.337) 0.900 (0.303) 
    fjudge 
 
0.390 (0.287) 1.477 (0.423) 
    lawprof 
 
-0.667 (0.438) 0.513 (0.225) 
    female 
 
-0.624* (0.320) 0.536 (0.171) 
    c_age 
 
0.020 (0.025) 1.021 (0.025) 
    interim 
 
0.640 (0.673) 1.897 (1.276) 
    chief 
 
-1.249* (0.714) 0.287 (0.205) 
    c_seniority -0.029 (0.027) 0.973 (0.026) 
    post2002 
 
-0.039 (0.397) 0.962 (0.382) 
    p4legisdep 
 
3.015** (1.239) 20.39 (25.27) 
    pappgov 
 
3.175** (1.433) 23.93 (34.30) 
    dissent 
 
-3.513*** (0.767) 0.030 (0.023) 
    c_complex 
 
-0.026 (0.067) 0.974 (0.065) 
    Intercept 
 
3.204*** (0.658) 24.63 (16.21) 
  Random effects 










  ρ 
 
.922 
  AIC 
 
 1599.071  
  BIC 
 
1713.15 
  Log likelihood -779.536 
  N(judges) 
 
2,217 
  N(panels)   445 
  Standard errors in parentheses 
    *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
    
Table 7.9. Likelihood-ratio test of models three and seven 
Model three nested in model seven 
 LR chi2(1)  =  20.30 
  Prob > chi2 =  0.000 






7.2 A reduced two-level model 
In part due to the exploratory nature of the analysis, and for the sake of parsimony, a reduced 
model was fitted to the judicial decisions data (table 7.10). The model was built by assessing 
each predictor’s impact on model fit individually rather than in blocks (not shown here). 
Table 7.11. presents the likelihood-ratio test of the reduced model (model eight) nested in 
model seven, and indicates that the reduced model provides a significantly better fit. A 
consideration of the values of the information criteria supports the test in that the reduced 
model fits the data better than the complete model presented in table 7.8.  
Eight predictors have significant effects in the reduced model fitted with maximum 
likelihood, not counting the intercept. Two predictors – econ and ogovadvocate – were 
included in the reduced model, but not in the full model presented in table 7.8. When added to 
the model individually, the variable indicating the presence of an economic issue did lead to 
an improved model fit unlike when added together with the variable indicating the presence of 
EU and EEA law in model five (table 7.6). The variable ogovadvocate is a variable indicating 
that the Office of the Government Advocate represented the state. In model six a similar 
variable – govadvocate – indicating the presence of the Government Advocate on behalf of 
the state did not lead to an improved fit (table 7.6). The small number of cases where the 
Government Advocate represents the state can have caused the insignificant effect. 
ogovadvocate is thus included in the reduced model to test if the insignificant result is 
replicated with a larger number of observations, or if hypothesis h2.3 can be confirmed.  
To test the robustness of the estimates the reduced model was re-estimated with penalized 
quasi-likelihood. The result is similar to the robustness test of the unconditional model in 
table 7.1. Maximum likelihood estimates appear to be generally higher than the estimates 
from the reweighted iterative generalized least squares estimation. Although penalized quasi-
likelihood is known to have a tendency to underestimate regression coefficients and variance 
components, the results from model nine will serve as the basis for the discussion in sections 
7.2.1 and 7.3. The conservative estimates are in line with the theoretical expectations, and in 
light of the sensitivity of the maximum likelihood estimates discussed in note 97 they appear 





Table 7.10. Two-level model of state friendly voting - reduced model (model eight and nine)     
  
Reduced model Reduced model fitted using pql2 
Variables   Coef. S.E. exp(b) S.E. Coef. S.E. exp(b) S.E. 
Fixed effects 
           flegisdep 
 
0.737*** (0.216) 2.089 (0.451) 0.563*** (0.172) 1.756 (0.302) 
  fjudge 
 
0.546*** (0.209) 1.725 (0.361) 0.428** (0.168) 1.534 (0.258) 
  female 
 
-0.514** (0.262) 0.598 (0.157)  -0.382* (0.208) 0.682 (0.142) 
  chief 
 
-1.159** (0.553) 0.314 (0.174)  -0.856** (0.431) 0.425 (0.183) 
  p4legisdep 
 
2.897** (1.267) 18.12 (22.96)  1.578* (0.941) 4.847 (4.560) 
  pappgov 
 
2.904** (1.436) 18.24 (26.19) 1.586 (1.231) 4.883 (6.009) 
  econ 
 
-0.533 (0.676) 0.587 (0.397)  -0.245 (0.465) 0.783 (0.364) 
  ogovadvocate 
 
1.636** (0.782) 5.137 (4.015) 0.857* (0.519) 2.357 (1.224) 
  dissent 
 
-3.418*** (0.752) 0.033 (0.025)  -1.519*** (0.458) 0.219 (0.100) 
  Intercept 
 
1.838** (0.843) 6.281 (5.297) 0.496 (0.568) 1.643 (0.934) 
Random effects 



























N(panels)   445 445 
Standard errors in parentheses   
      *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
     pql2 = second order penalized quasi-likelihood linearization 
      
Table 7.11. Likelihood-ratio test of models seven and eight 
Model eight nested in model seven 
 LR chi2(9)  =  0.53 
  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
   
7.2.1 Interpretation of the reduced model 
The model refitted with penalized quasi-likelihood differs slightly from the reduced model 
estimated with maximum likelihood (models nine and eight). As in the unconditional model 
presented in table 7.1 the variance and intraclass correlation are reduced in the refitted model. 
Only seven predictors are significant in this model, compared to the eight significant 
predictors obtained with the maximum likelihood estimation. The panel effect of appointing 
government is no longer significant, and the significance level of four of the other predictors 




employment with the Legislation Department (flegisdep); the effect of having served as a 
judge prior to appointment to the Supreme Court (fjudge); an effect of being female (female); 
an effect of being the Chief Justice (chief); an effect of Government Advocate representation 
(ogovadvocate); and an effect of there being a dissenting vote in a case (dissent) (table 7.10).  
Logistic regression coefficients are interpreted as the predicted probability of an outcome 
when all other coefficients are set to zero.
100
 The probability of voting for the state for a male 
justice without any of the employment characteristics or panel characteristics present (all 
variables set to zero) in a case where there is a unanimous decision is 62.2 percent. For a 
female justice there is a predicted probability of voting for the state of 52.8 percent given the 
same characteristics (table 7.10).  
Former employment with the Legislation Department prior to appointment to the Supreme 
Court has a positive effect on state friendly voting. For a male justice with this background 
the predicted probability of a state friendly vote is 74.2 percent, a relatively large increase in 
absolute value from a justice without this experience. The predicted probability of a female 
justice voting in favor of the state if she has previously been employed at the Legislation 
Department is 66.3 percent. Previously having served as a judge has a predicted probability 
similar to that of former employment with the legislative department for both male and female 
justices, with probabilities of 71.6 percent and 63.2 percent (table 7.10). 
If the office of the Government Advocate represents the state the predicted probabilities 
increase. A male justice without any other characteristics present has a predicted probability 
of 79.5 percent for voting for the state. Female justices have a similar increase, the probability 
increasing 19.7 percentage points to a predicted probability of 72.5 percent. When former 
employment at the Legislation Department is accounted for the predicted probabilities 
increases to 87.2 percent for male justices and 82.3 percent for female justices.   
The effect of being the Chief Justice is interesting. Contrary to the predicted probability of 
62.2 percent for a male justice when all other variables are set to zero, the predicted 
probability for a Chief Justice is 41.1 percent. If the Office of the Government Advocate 
represents the state the predicted probability of a vote pursuant of the state increases to 62.2 
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percent for the Chief Justice. In combination with having previously served as a judge the 
probability is 71.6 percent.  
Three panel effects have significant values in model nine (table 7.10). For male justices the 
effect of being in a panel where there are four justices with background from the Legislation 
Department is a predicted probability of 88.8 percent for a vote pursuant of the state. Female 
justices have a predicted probability of 84.4 percent. In combination with background from 
the Legislation Department the predicted probability is 93.3 percent for male justices and 90.5 
percent for female justices. If the Office of the Government Advocate represents the state, 
which is the second significant panel effect, the predicted probabilities increase to 97.1 
percent for male justices and 95.7 percent for female justices.  
Cases where there are dissenting votes, the final significant panel effect, tend to produce 
lower predicted probabilities for a vote pursuant of the state. The predicted probability of 26.4 
percent for male justices and 19.7 percent for female justices in cases where there is a non-
unanimous decision is a clear indication of this effect. However, when the Office of the 
Government Advocate represents the state the predicted probabilities increase to 59.8 percent 
and 50.4 percent for male and females, respectively. If there is a four justice majority panel 
with background from the Legislation Department the probability is similar to that in 
unanimous decisions with predictions of 87.8 and 83.1 percent.  
There is a caveat related to the interpretation of the predicted probabilities in cases with non-
unanimous decisions. A preliminary analysis including only cases with dissenting votes 
suggested that there is no variance explained by the grouping structure of the data (not shown 
here). When non-unanimous cases are analyzed the significant effects of panel predictors are 
no longer apparent. Thus the results of the analysis explain the decisions of justices in cases 
with unanimous decisions, but the decisions of the justices in cases where there are dissenting 
votes are not thoroughly explained by the hierarchical model. However, from a theoretical and 
statistical point of view there is substantial justification for analysis of judicial decisions 
employing multilevel modeling. The choice of including only non-unanimous decisions may 
introduce bias in the estimates and would only explain behavior in cases where there is not a 
unanimous decision.
101
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7.3 Hypothesis testing and theoretical expectations in light of model estimations 
7.3.1 Individual-level predictors and hypotheses 
The results from the reduced hierarchical model estimated with penalized quasi-likelihood 
(table 7.10) provide support for four of the hypotheses presented in table 4.1. At the 
individual level the effect of former employment with the Legislation Department is 
significant. This supports the hypothesis that former employment at the department increases 
the likelihood of a justice voting for the state (h1.2). A positive effect reflects the theoretical 
expectations and the results of other analyses of state friendly voting.  
The second hypothesis at the individual-level supported by the results is the effect of previous 
legal career. Although neither former employment with the Office of the Government 
Advocate nor former employment with the Director General of Public Prosecutions had 
significant effects, there were significant effects of former employment with the Legislation 
Department and having served as a judge prior to appointment to the Supreme Court. 
However, considering that the control variables for private practice and law professors were 
insignificant, the support for hypothesis h1.1 is rather weak. There appears to be an effect of 
the previous legal career of the justices, but only for some career types. 
Hypotheses h1.3 to h1.6 were not confirmed by the results of the regression analysis. Based 
on previous analyses of the state friendly voting of the Supreme Court justices in cases with 
non-unanimous decisions by Grendstad et al. (2011b) and Jacobsen (2011) hypotheses h1.3, 
h1.4 and h1.6 were not expected to be confirmed. However, in light of on the results from an 
analysis of economic voting by Grendstad et al. (2011c) the effect of being born in Oslo was 
expected to have an influence on the model fit, if not a significant effect. 
One of the more interesting results of the analysis is the absence of an effect of appointing 
government. At no point in the analysis did the variable indicating appointment by a social-
democratic government retain a significant effect. Thus there is no evidence of a relation 
between appointing government and the ideological preferences of the justices. As discussed 
earlier the measurement of ideology is indirect, and there is a potential for failing to capture 
the effect of ideology when this measure is applied in statistical analyses. One reason might 




rather a ‘system friendly’ preference.
102
 When Grendstad et al. (2011b) analyze decisions 
between 1945 and 2009 they fail to account for the fact that Social-Democratic governments 
were in power for the majority of the period in question. A vote pursuant of the state 
preference might thus indicate a system friendly inclination. In order to test this effect one 
would have to control for the incumbent government to see whether the pattern changes when 
there is a change in government. Hence, the conclusion drawn from this analysis is that there 
is not an effect of appointing government in Supreme Court decisions after 1990 in civil cases 
where the state was party to the proceedings.    
7.3.2 Panel-level predictors and hypotheses 
Hypotheses at the panel-level included hypotheses h2.1 and h2.2 (table 4.1). They were 
represented in the analysis by the variables p4legisdep and pappgov, which indicated panel 
composition. Only the effect of a four justice majority with background from the Legislation 
Department remained significant in the refitted reduced model (table 7.10). The 
overrepresentation of justices with background from the Legislation Department has a 
substantial impact on state friendly voting. Collegiality is thus confirmed as a significant 
factor influencing the vota of the Supreme Court justices. These findings support the 
assertions made by Kjønstad (1999) and Schei (2004) concerning the legal environment of the 
Court discussed in section 4.5.1.  
7.3.3 Case-level predictors and hypotheses 
The case-specific hypotheses include hypotheses h2.3 through h2.7 presented in table 4.1. Of 
these hypotheses only h2.4 is supported by the findings, and this is only after it has been 
revised to include representation by the Office of the Government Advocate rather than the 
Government Advocate. Hypothesis h2.3 is supported if one considers the representation of the 
state by the Office of the Government Advocate as an indication of importance. However, 
with the insignificant effects of economic cases and cases concerning EU and EEA law this 
hypothesis is not well supported by the findings.   
7.3.4 Theoretical expectations 
In light of the theoretical expectations the findings were as expected even though several of 
the hypotheses were rejected. The support for a hierarchical model is substantial, as seen in 
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the effect the different analytical approaches integrated in the hierarchical model had on the 
model estimates. Background characteristics do account for some of the variation in the votes 
of the justices, but the multilevel analysis indicates that a substantial part of the variation is 
explained by panel-specific predictors and case-specific predictors. The results suggest that to 
ignore the collegial nature of the Supreme Court and the effect of case-specific factors will 
lead to a severely underspecified model. Thus the theoretical expectations of the 
appropriateness of an integrated model of judicial behavior hold for decisions in which the 
state is a party to the proceedings.    
7.4 Limitations of the study – applicability of international research and methodological 
approaches 
A potential limitation of the study is the methodological approach and the applicability of 
international research in studies of judicial behavior in the Norwegian courts. Sunde (2012, 
172) questions the approach taken by Grendstad et al. (2010), who base their analyses on 
models developed in the American judicial literature. In response to Sunde’s reservations on 
the use of an American framework for studies of the Norwegian judicial system some of the 
issues concerning method and the relevance of research and literature are considered briefly in 
the following paragraphs. 
7.4.1 Judicial politics in Europe 
Research on judicial policy-making in Europe remains limited in some respects compared to 
the extensive coverage the topic has received in the United States. The traditional distinction 
between common law and civil law systems has been acknowledged as one of the underlying 
reasons for the difference (Rehder 2007, 6). Historically, according to Shapiro and Stone 
(1994, 397-398), there has been “a strong commitment in Western liberal-democratic political 
ideology to the separation of law and politics and to a vision of judges as independent, neutral 
law appliers rather than political policy makers”. In this sense the prevailing perception has 
been that courts and judges were outside politics. The judges are being tasked with applying 







7.4.2 Judicial politics in the United States 
In the United States, the Supreme Court justices are appointed by the President with the 
advice and consent of the Senate. Article III of the United States Constitution provides that 
justices “shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour” – the term “good behaviour” 
understood to mean justices may serve for life, unless impeached and convicted by Congress, 
resign or retire. The nature of the appointment procedure makes it political, as Presidents have 
a tendency to appoint justices broadly sharing their ideological views. This relates to the 
jurisdiction of the Court, regulated by section two in Article III of the Constitution: An 
important category of law for the Supreme Court is constitutional questions, and this area has 
a clearer political dimension than other categories (Sunde 2012, 176). In the United States the 
courts have a long history of determining constitutional limits for legislatures, and 
consequently it is not surprising that appointments to the Supreme Court and other federal 
courts have become partisan political issues (Ferejohn 2002, 41). The ability judges have to 
write separate opinions and dissenting opinions, in addition to decisions offering binding 
precedent also separates the United States Supreme Court from most of the European high 
courts.  
Judicial politics literature on the U.S. Supreme Court was dominated by the attitudinal model 
from the 1960s throughout the early 1990s (Dyevre 2010, 301),
103
 with Jeffrey A. Segal and 
Harold J. Spaeth currently being its leading advocates (see Segal and Spaeth 2002).
104
 Until 
recently the use of the attitudinal model has been virtually absent from research on European 
courts, and it has been argued that the methods used to study the American judicial system 
cannot be applied to the study of judicial politics in Europe (Dyevre 2010, 300). The 
conventional explanation points to the secrecy surrounding judicial deliberation and the 
prohibition of separate opinions on some European courts. Where separate or dissenting 
opinions are allowed they tend to be rare, and this lack of voting records and anecdotal 
evidence limits the usefulness of the attitudinal approach (Stone Sweet 2000, 48). In European 
courts the actions of individual justices are masked by the use of a single opinion ‘of the 
court’ to enhance prestige and legitimacy. As a result the focus shifts from the individual as 
the unit of analysis to the institution (Volcansek 1999, 2).  
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 The attitudinal model, as asserted in chapter three, claims that judges are seekers of policy, and make 
decisions in light of their brute policy preferences (Benesh and Spaeth 2007, 756; Dyevre 2010, 300; Segal and 




In the American literature the late 1990s and early 2000s offered a “sea change” in studies of 
judicial politics as variants of the social-psychological paradigm began to give way to rational 
choice approaches (Epstein and Knight 2000, 625). This strategic approach to judicial politics 
places actors within a larger framework. According to Epstein and Jacobi (2010, 342), 
“[j]udges do not make decisions in a vacuum, but rather take into account the preferences and 
likely actions of other relevant actors, including (a) their colleagues, (b) their judicial 
superiors, and (c) members of the other branches of government”.  
7.4.3 Historical perspective 
Research on European courts has historically focused on the macro-level and the political 
impact and functions of judicial action, while the focus in American research has been 
predominantly on the micro-level and politics of judicial action. The difference in perspective 
leads back to the differing perceptions of the legal system – the American literature viewing it 
as an extension of the political system and the European literature viewing it as an 
autonomous sphere (Rehder 2007, 17). Strategic accounts of judicial decision-making follows 
this framework. The internal form, which views judicial decisions as a collegial game, is more 
common in the American literature than in the European, which mostly focuses on the 
external relationship between the courts and other political actors.
105
  
A third factor, disregarded by many social scientists both in the American and European 
literature, is legal doctrine.
106
 The disregard is based on the presumption that the law, as 
understood by legal academics, does not really matter to judges (Tiller and Cross 2006, 522). 
Central to the discussion of judicial behavior in this thesis has been how law together with 
institutional factors can constrain preference initiated behavior on the Supreme Court.  
7.4.4 Comparative frameworks 
The Norwegian Supreme Court is one of the few high courts aside from the other Nordic 
courts and those of the British Isles with the competence to handle all civil and criminal cases 
in addition to administrative law and constitutional questions. As the Norwegian Supreme 
Court is not a constitutional court the juridical dimension is more prominent in the decision-
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structure than the political dimension (Sunde 2012, 177-178). However, there are several 
similarities between the U.S. Supreme Court and the Norwegian Supreme Court, which 
supports the use and application of models developed for studying the American judicial 
system in analyses of the decisions of the Norwegian Supreme Court: Appointments to both 
courts are irremovable, and retirement at age 70 in the Norwegian Supreme Court is not very 
different from the life-long tenure of the American justices. Separate and dissenting opinions 
are encouraged in both courts, and opinions are made public.
107
 Another distinctive feature 
present in the U.S. Courts of Appeals (but not the Supreme Court) and the Norwegian 
Supreme Court is random assignment of justices to rotating panels. 
Both the attitudinal approach and the strategic approach have the potential to yield valid and 
interesting results in studies of the Norwegian Supreme Court. Arguments against using 
American methods when studying European courts do not consider that the Norwegian 
Supreme Court is more similar to the United States Supreme Court than most of the European 
high courts and constitutional courts. However, neither the attitudinal model nor the strategic 
interaction model in and of themselves provides an adequate framework for studying the 
judicial system. With focus on the ‘state friendly’ hypothesis this study asserted that models 
developed in the American judicial behavior literature, with slight alterations, can yield 
significant results when analyzing judicial decisions in Norway.
108
 
7.4.5 Limited inference 
As previously asserted in section 6.1.2 the Supreme Court’s selection procedure raises the 
potential for selection bias in the inferences drawn from its cases. Scholars can draw 
conclusions within a single set of cases, so long as it is recognized that any effects of case 
factors so measured cannot be said to represent general preferences of the judges over all 
cases or as applied to other sets of cases (Kastellec and Lax 2008, 408, 436). “[C]onclusions 
about judicial behavior may vary by court, by judge, and by case, or even by the time period 
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in which decisions are rendered” (Friedman 2006, 271). The result of the analysis is thus only 
applicable for other civil cases proximate in time to the case sample of the analysis. 
Another limitation of the study is that inferences can only be made for the votes of the 
individual justices and not the case outcomes. Hence the assertion of Kastellec and Lax (2008, 
436) regarding consequences of extra-legal factors – “whether judicial diversity has large-
scale consequences depends on whether it leads to differences not just in individual voting by 
judges, but also to differences in case outcomes” – cannot be affirmed with the analytical 
framework presented in this thesis. For these types of inferences an alternative framework is 




Chapter 8 - Conclusion 
The aim of this thesis was to test the state friendly hypothesis by comparing and integrating 
three different approaches to the study of judicial behavior based on the following research 
question: What factors can explain the decisions of Supreme Court justices when the state is a 
party?  
An integrated model of judicial behavior was developed based on previous research from 
Norway and the United States to account for attitudinal, legal and strategic factors believed to 
influence judicial decision-making. This model served as the framework for the discussion of 
the state friendly nature of the Norwegian Supreme Court. From the four claims of the state 
friendly hypothesis several hypotheses were derived to assess the effect of 24 legal and extra-
legal factors on the propensity for state friendly voting. These hypotheses were related to 
different factors at distinct levels of the hierarchical model of judicial behavior. 
The two-level hierarchical framework suggested the requirement of a multilevel analytical 
method, and from the theoretical and statistical discussion this was affirmed. Thus a two-level 
multilevel generalized linear model where judges are nested in panels was established to 
analyze the judicial decisions data. At the second level of the model both factors relating to 
the judicial panels and case-specific variables were included. Within this structure factors 
derived from attitudinal model is fitted to level-one and factors derived from the legal model 
and strategic model to level-two.  
An unconditional model provided the empirical justification for employing multilevel 
analysis. Then several models of increasing complexity were fitted to the data with maximum 
likelihood estimation to assess the impact of the different theoretical models. Finally, a 
reduced model was established by assessing each predictor’s impact on the model fit 
individually. To test the robustness of the results the model was refitted with penalized quasi-
likelihood approximation. Based on the theoretical expectations and statistical framework the 
refitted reduced model was preferred to the reduced model estimated with maximum 
likelihood.  
The findings of the hierarchical regression analysis offer support for the theoretical 
framework. From the assessment of the intraclass correlation coefficient the appropriateness 
of a multilevel analytical approach was confirmed. The analysis identified seven significant 




significant predictors included both individual-level factors and group-level factors. Level-
one predictors associated with the attitudinal approach to judicial decisions confirmed the 
hypothesis linking former employment with the Legislation Department to a justice 
propensity to vote pursuant of the state. The other hypotheses associated with the individual-
level of the model were not supported by the findings. Interestingly, this included the 
hypothesis linking appointing government to state friendly voting. None of the models found 
any support for this assertion.  
Collegiality was confirmed as an influential factor by the findings. A panel-specific predictor 
indicating a four-justice majority with background from the Legislation Department had a 
substantial effect on the propensity for a state friendly vote. For male justices there is a 
predicted probability of 88.8 percent for voting pursuant of the state if the case is decided in a 
panel with these attributes. This suggests that the strategic approach to studies of judicial 
decisions should be accounted for in analyses of the Norwegian Supreme Court. The other 
hypothesis concerned with the impact of strategic interaction, the panel effect of appointing 
government, was not supported by the findings. This is surprising considering the impact 
ideology have had at the individual-level in other studies of judicial behavior.  
The legal model is also supported by the findings, although not to the same extent as the 
attitudinal and strategic approach. When the state is represented by the Office of the 
Government Advocate the predicted probability of voting for the state increase for all justices. 
This supports the expected constraining influence of case-specific factors. Hence this effect 
should be accounted for in other analyses of judicial decisions. There was, however, no 
support for the other case-specific hypotheses. The expected impact of salient cases was 
nonexistent, and whether the state appeared as plaintiff or respondent had no effect on the 
votes of the justices. 
This thesis has argued that integrated models of judicial behavior estimated within 
hierarchical frameworks are preferable to the limited focus of the attitudinal model in single-
level analyses. In unanimous decisions there is variance explained by the grouping structure 
in the data, which it is not possible to model in single-level analyses. The identification of 







Attitudinal approaches were the dominant force in the judicial politics literature in the United 
States for close to 40 years. More recently, Grendstad et al. (2010; 2011a; 2011b; 2011c; 
2012b; 2012c) and Shaffer et al. (2011) have advocated use of the attitudinal framework 
provided by Segal and Spaeth (2002) in studies of the decisions of the Norwegian Supreme 
Court. The findings in this thesis have indicated that strategic factors and legal factors also 
influence judicial behavior and decision-making. Votes pursuant of the state are not merely 
influenced by the political preferences and attitudes of the justices, but rather, in the terms of 
Brace and Hall (1993, 917), by “a complex interaction of rules, preferences and structures”. 
The findings suggest that by omitting institutional features of judicial behavior models are 
indeed rendered simplistic and incomplete, thus confirming the assertions of Sunde (2012) 
regarding the effect of intellectual and institutional structures. 
Theoretical, empirical and statistical justifications for the application of a multilevel model to 
fit the hierarchical judicial decisions data indicate that analyses ignoring these structures are 
incorrectly specified. To avoid the probable misspecification of models conducted at only a 
single level, methodological approaches controlling for the multilevel nature of the judicial 
decisions data should be considered in studies of judicial decisions.   
8.2 Suggestions for future research 
The hierarchical generalized linear model utilized in the analysis in this thesis can be 
extended to include random coefficients and cross-level interactions in addition to random 
intercepts. An alternative structure where the individual influence on case outcomes is 
assessed would also provide an interesting endeavor and enable a test of the assertions of 
Kastellec and Lax (2008) concerning the consequences of judicial diversity. The multiple 
membership structure of the judicial decisions data should also be tested to see whether it 
affects the estimated intraclass correlation and regression coefficients in the manner identified 




Appendix A - Cases 
Table A1. List of cases 
   
     Rt-1990-1235 Rt-1993-278 Rt-1995-72 Rt-1998-1328 Rt-1999-946 
Rt-1990-1274 Rt-1993-321 Rt-1995-85 Rt-1998-1372 Rt-2000-1028 
Rt-1990-1285 Rt-1993-409 Rt-1995-955 Rt-1998-1425 Rt-2000-1056 
Rt-1990-410 Rt-1993-528 Rt-1996-1122 Rt-1998-1666 Rt-2000-1066 
Rt-1990-657 Rt-1993-578 Rt-1996-1188 Rt-1998-1742 Rt-2000-1214 
Rt-1990-781 Rt-1993-587 Rt-1996-1190 Rt-1998-1764 Rt-2000-1473 
Rt-1990-791 Rt-1993-66 Rt-1996-1384 Rt-1998-1771 Rt-2000-1729 
Rt-1990-838 Rt-1993-671 Rt-1996-1410 Rt-1998-1779 Rt-2000-1739 
Rt-1990-861 Rt-1993-694 Rt-1996-1457 Rt-1998-1794 Rt-2000-1865 
Rt-1990-946 Rt-1993-739 Rt-1996-1473 Rt-1998-1795 Rt-2000-1981 
Rt-1991-1090 Rt-1994-1036 Rt-1996-1495 Rt-1998-1988 Rt-2000-2014 
Rt-1991-1104 Rt-1994-1105 Rt-1996-1510 Rt-1998-29 Rt-2000-220 
Rt-1991-1157 Rt-1994-1244 Rt-1996-232 Rt-1998-383 Rt-2000-23 
Rt-1991-1167 Rt-1994-132 Rt-1996-369 Rt-1998-40 Rt-2000-244 
Rt-1991-1311 Rt-1994-1398 Rt-1996-509 Rt-1998-430 Rt-2000-253 
Rt-1991-1355 Rt-1994-1470 Rt-1996-51 Rt-1998-607 Rt-2000-268 
Rt-1991-1468 Rt-1994-1545 Rt-1996-513 Rt-1998-623 Rt-2000-402 
Rt-1991-424 Rt-1994-158 Rt-1996-551 Rt-1998-794 Rt-2000-436 
Rt-1991-557 Rt-1994-235 Rt-1996-561 Rt-1998-811 Rt-2000-452 
Rt-1991-586 Rt-1994-323 Rt-1996-568 Rt-1998-929 Rt-2000-46 
Rt-1991-624 Rt-1994-326 Rt-1996-6 Rt-1998-937 Rt-2000-591 
Rt-1991-668 Rt-1994-557 Rt-1997-1099 Rt-1999-1087 Rt-2000-758 
Rt-1991-745 Rt-1994-568 Rt-1997-1430 Rt-1999-1303 Rt-2000-772 
Rt-1991-954 Rt-1994-691 Rt-1997-1564 Rt-1999-1312 Rt-2000-788 
Rt-1992-1105 Rt-1994-76 Rt-1997-1602 Rt-1999-1347 Rt-2000-977 
Rt-1992-1150 Rt-1994-813 Rt-1997-1646 Rt-1999-138 Rt-2001-1006 
Rt-1992-1235 Rt-1995-1 Rt-1997-1784 Rt-1999-14 Rt-2001-1049 
Rt-1992-1303 Rt-1995-1044 Rt-1997-1987 Rt-1999-1502 Rt-2001-1123 
Rt-1992-1401 Rt-1995-124 Rt-1997-343 Rt-1999-1517 Rt-2001-1163 
Rt-1992-1511 Rt-1995-1278 Rt-1997-383 Rt-1999-157 Rt-2001-1201 
Rt-1992-217 Rt-1995-1317 Rt-1997-403 Rt-1999-1916 Rt-2001-1229 
Rt-1992-229 Rt-1995-1422 Rt-1997-407 Rt-1999-1924 Rt-2001-1265 
Rt-1992-242 Rt-1995-1529 Rt-1997-410 Rt-1999-1980 Rt-2001-1444 
Rt-1992-306 Rt-1995-1636 Rt-1997-428 Rt-1999-458 Rt-2001-1481 
Rt-1992-321 Rt-1995-1939 Rt-1997-51 Rt-1999-608 Rt-2001-1497 
Rt-1992-581 Rt-1995-350 Rt-1997-550 Rt-1999-637 Rt-2001-1661 
Rt-1992-643 Rt-1995-447 Rt-1997-580 Rt-1999-727 Rt-2001-170 
Rt-1993-1220 Rt-1995-455 Rt-1997-653 Rt-1999-74 Rt-2001-187 
Rt-1993-1333 Rt-1995-479 Rt-1997-860 Rt-1999-748 Rt-2001-207 
Rt-1993-249 Rt-1995-506 Rt-1998-1140 Rt-1999-901 Rt-2001-282 




Table A1. continued 
   
     Rt-2001-428 Rt-2003-619 Rt-2005-394 Rt-2006-720 Rt-2008-233 
Rt-2001-450 Rt-2003-662 Rt-2005-416 Rt-2006-735 Rt-2008-270 
Rt-2001-512 Rt-2003-764 Rt-2005-469 Rt-2006-769 Rt-2008-343 
Rt-2001-640 Rt-2003-82 Rt-2005-495 Rt-2007-1 Rt-2008-410 
Rt-2001-752 Rt-2003-833 Rt-2005-548 Rt-2007-1003 Rt-2008-438 
Rt-2001-762 Rt-2003-861 Rt-2005-577 Rt-2007-1217 Rt-2008-478 
Rt-2001-851 Rt-2004-1092 Rt-2005-597 Rt-2007-1263 Rt-2008-513 
Rt-2001-995 Rt-2004-1105 Rt-2005-607 Rt-2007-1354 Rt-2008-524 
Rt-2002-1080 Rt-2004-134 Rt-2005-692 Rt-2007-140 Rt-2008-560 
Rt-2002-1247 Rt-2004-1343 Rt-2005-734 Rt-2007-1401 Rt-2008-577 
Rt-2002-1298 Rt-2004-1723 Rt-2005-855 Rt-2007-1511 Rt-2008-681 
Rt-2002-1322 Rt-2004-1737 Rt-2005-86 Rt-2007-1543 Rt-2008-688 
Rt-2002-1331 Rt-2004-1860 Rt-2005-951 Rt-2007-1573 Rt-2008-727 
Rt-2002-1469 Rt-2004-1921 Rt-2006-1062 Rt-2007-1612 Rt-2008-738 
Rt-2002-164 Rt-2004-1985 Rt-2006-1099 Rt-2007-1653 Rt-2008-794 
Rt-2002-1646 Rt-2004-2 Rt-2006-1105 Rt-2007-1801 Rt-2008-803 
Rt-2002-1691 Rt-2004-200 Rt-2006-1129 Rt-2007-1815 Rt-2008-932 
Rt-2002-180 Rt-2004-2000 Rt-2006-1199 Rt-2007-1822 Rt-2008-939 
Rt-2002-19 Rt-2004-241 Rt-2006-1217 Rt-2007-209 Rt-2009-105 
Rt-2002-304 Rt-2004-312 Rt-2006-1232 Rt-2007-246 Rt-2009-1090 
Rt-2002-352 Rt-2004-344 Rt-2006-1265 Rt-2007-257 Rt-2009-1153 
Rt-2002-387 Rt-2004-487 Rt-2006-1281 Rt-2007-281 Rt-2009-1195 
Rt-2002-391 Rt-2004-523 Rt-2006-1300 Rt-2007-302 Rt-2009-1208 
Rt-2002-456 Rt-2004-569 Rt-2006-1348 Rt-2007-392 Rt-2009-1237 
Rt-2002-618 Rt-2004-583 Rt-2006-1367 Rt-2007-667 Rt-2009-1261 
Rt-2002-64 Rt-2004-658 Rt-2006-1382 Rt-2007-721 Rt-2009-1356 
Rt-2002-718 Rt-2004-738 Rt-2006-1435 Rt-2007-848 Rt-2009-1374 
Rt-2002-747 Rt-2004-957 Rt-2006-1519 Rt-2007-899 Rt-2009-1400 
Rt-2002-798 Rt-2004-992 Rt-2006-1573 Rt-2007-912 Rt-2009-1432 
Rt-2002-996 Rt-2005-1157 Rt-2006-1649 Rt-2008-1014 Rt-2009-1473 
Rt-2003-1233 Rt-2005-117 Rt-2006-1657 Rt-2008-1160 Rt-2009-1485 
Rt-2003-1324 Rt-2005-1356 Rt-2006-1665 Rt-2008-1284 Rt-2009-1577 
Rt-2003-1345 Rt-2005-1409 Rt-2006-262 Rt-2008-1307 Rt-2009-1626 
Rt-2003-1531 Rt-2005-1421 Rt-2006-333 Rt-2008-1336 Rt-2009-1632 
Rt-2003-1730 Rt-2005-1434 Rt-2006-343 Rt-2008-135 Rt-2009-170 
Rt-2003-1821 Rt-2005-1461 Rt-2006-349 Rt-2008-145 Rt-2009-203 
Rt-2003-185 Rt-2005-1550 Rt-2006-364 Rt-2008-1510 Rt-2009-32 
Rt-2003-293 Rt-2005-1585 Rt-2006-396 Rt-2008-1537 Rt-2009-354 
Rt-2003-375 Rt-2005-1638 Rt-2006-404 Rt-2008-1555 Rt-2009-425 
Rt-2003-409 Rt-2005-1647 Rt-2006-449 Rt-2008-1665 Rt-2009-441 
Rt-2003-504 Rt-2005-229 Rt-2006-564 Rt-2008-1705 Rt-2009-534 
Rt-2003-536 Rt-2005-238 Rt-2006-593 Rt-2008-1747 Rt-2009-546 
Rt-2003-557 Rt-2005-279 Rt-2006-602 Rt-2008-195 Rt-2009-661 































Table A1. continued 
























Appendix B - Coding procedure 
The variables not retrieved from the DORANOH database include all the panel-specific 
variables and five of the case-specific variables. Panel-specific variables are simple 
aggregations of the individual-level DORANOH data. The case-specific variables were coded 
from decisions published in the Lovdata Foundation legal information system. Lists of 
decisions for each year included in the analysis were retrieved from the DORANOH database 
prior to coding new variables. This ensured that the information on the cases present in the 
DORANOH database did not deviate from the decisions published by Lovdata. After the 
case-specific variable had been coded they were merged with the individual data retrieved 
from the DORANOH database.  
A variable indicating whether the state won or lost served as a preliminary indicator of state 
friendly voting. This was then recoded after the dataset was merged based on information on 
the votes of the individual justices and an additional variable indicating if the state appeared 
as plaintiff or respondent. The assessment of whether the state won or lost was done by the 
author based on the information provided by Lovdata and a review of the outcome of each 
decision. Decisions where the outcome was unclear were excluded from the analysis. Thus 
any misspecifications in the coding of the dependent variable and the selection of cases are 
entirely due to the author. 
The coding of the presence of the Government Advocate and the representation of the state by 
the Office of the Government Advocate followed the same procedure as the indicator for 
plaintiff or respondent. These variables are based on information listed in the field parter in 
the Lovdata database. Case complexity, which is a count of the number of legal sources cited 
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